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THE RIGHT NOT TO USE IN PROPERTY AND
PATENT LAW
Oskar Liivak† & Eduardo M. Peñalver††

In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court held (1) that patent owners have an absolute right not to practice their patent and (2) that even these nonpracticing patent owners are
entitled to the liberal use of injunctive relief against infringers. Both of these
holdings have been very important to the viability of patent assertion entities,
the so-called patent trolls. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the
Supreme Court softened the injunction rule. In this Article, we argue that
Congress or the Court should reconsider Continental Paper Bag’s embrace
of an absolute right not to use, not because patents are not property but
because the considerations at work within both property and patent law do
not support recognizing such an unbounded right not to use. The Court’s
endorsement of a robust right not to use patents was based on an overly
simplistic analogy to tangible property, which the Court characterized as recognizing “the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without
question of motive.”1 The Court’s reasoning was flawed in two respects.
First, the law of tangible property distinguishes among nonusers, penalizing
owners whose nonuse interferes with other owners’ use of their own property
or induces others to waste time or effort appropriating the unused property.
With respect to these derelict nonusers, the law employs numerous doctrines,
such as nuisance, undue hardship, estoppel, abandonment, adverse possession, and permissive waste, to ensure that owners’ decision not to use their
property does not inflict harm on others. Second, the Court in Continental
Paper Bag failed to consider the ways in which the reasons for recognizing a
right not to use might differ in the contexts of patent and tangible property.
Although the same basic considerations are potentially at play in both contexts—efficiency, autonomy, and personhood—the implications of nonuse
differ in the patent context because of information’s nonrivalrous nature and
because of the particularly powerful way that patent law constrains the freedom of nonowners. Taking these factors into account suggests that the firstorder normative case for recognizing a robust right not to use a patent is
weaker than in the domain of tangible property. This is especially true when
nonusing owners attempt to enforce their patents against independent inven† Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School.
†† John P. Wilson Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Research for this article was supported in part by the Roger Levin Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago.
The authors are grateful to Larissa Katz, Marshall Phelps, Jeff Rachlinski, and Lior
Strahilevitz for helpful comments and suggestions, and to participants in faculty workshops
at George Washington, Tulane, and Cornell law schools.
1
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
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tors. As a consequence, in cases brought against independent inventors, we
suggest making patent remedies contingent on a patent owner’s efforts to
disseminate their inventions. Recognition of such an obligation to use in
patents would significantly reduce the threats posed by patent trolls and the
high-tech patent wars.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, media discussions have increasingly cast patents
and patent litigation in a negative light.2 This represents a dramatic
shift from the past, when commentators tended to contrast a relatively
uncontroversial patent system with the uncertainty and conflict surrounding copyright and trademark in the digital age.3 More often
2
See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2012, at A1 (describing a software company’s costly struggle against a rival company’s
broad patent assertion).
3
See, e.g., Burton T. Ong, Patenting the Biological Bounty: Re-Examining the Status of
Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 38 (2004)
(“In contrast to the ideological imbroglios that occupy the academic landscapes of copy-
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than not, these negative media discussions of patents have featured
the curious character of the patent troll.
In eBay v. MercExchange, Justice Kennedy earnestly asked, “[I]s the
troll the scary thing under the bridge, or is it a fishing technique?”4
In that case, eBay had been found to have infringed MercExchange’s
valid U.S. patent and was trying to fend off a permanent injunction.5
Such an injunction would have shut down or forced modification of at
least part of eBay’s operations unless eBay managed to pay
MercExchange what was sure to be an enormous sum to settle the
lawsuit.6 In a last-ditch effort to extricate itself from that bind, eBay
asked the Supreme Court to lift the threat of the injunction.7 There
was no doubt, as eBay’s lawyer put it, that “[f]or my clients, [a patent
troll has] been the scary thing under the bridge.”8 And this has been
the sentiment of many recent patent defendants. They have described trolls, perhaps less tendentiously referred to as patent assertion entities,9 as engaging in “[e]xtortion, pure and simple.”10
Perhaps motivated by a concern with the potential of injunctive relief
to facilitate such extortion, the Court in eBay significantly softened the
presumption in favor of granting injunctions upon a showing of patent infringement.11
Mark Lemley has called patent assertion “[t]he most significant
problem facing the patent system today.”12 Solutions have been slow
to materialize. First, many commentators are not convinced there is a
problem at all.13 For them, patent assertion is consistent with the very
right and trademark law, patent law has not been a popular battleground for intellectual
property theorists.”).
4
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
5
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390–91.
6
Rather infamously, Research in Motion was forced to settle a similar lawsuit for
$612.5 million against NTP, a patent assertion entity. Mike Musgrove, For NTP, Battle Worth
Fighting Ends in Vindication over Patent, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2006, at D1.
7
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390–91.
8
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 26.
9
Patent assertion is defined for this Article as the “assert[ion of] patents against
successful companies that independently develop and manufacture technology without
knowledge of those patents” and without the “manufacture [of] products or transfer [of]
technology” by the patent owner. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of
Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (2007).
10
Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls 14 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Papers Series, Accepted Paper No. 09-12, 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251.
11
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
12
Lemley, supra note 9, at 1526.
13
See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities
in the Patent System 10 (Chicago-Kent Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2012-03, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117421 (“By creating
options to generate rewards for innovators otherwise shutout of the marketplace . . . NPEs
may play a valuable role.”).
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purpose of the patent system—the revenue generated from this practice is seen as part of the incentive structure that patents are designed
to create.14 The commentators see attacks on patent trolls not only as
misguided but also as likely to undermine the purpose of the whole
system.15
Even among those who do perceive problems with patent assertion, there is no consensus about how to respond. Though a few
scholars have proposed outright abandonment of the patent system,16
most try to thread the needle by designing reforms that will dampen
or prevent the harms of patent assertion without disrupting the rest of
patent law.17 Achieving this balanced goal has been challenging in
large part because the contextual sensitivity it demands appears incompatible with a patent system that tends to operate in rather absolute terms.
Those who want to defend absolutist approaches to patent rights
often do so by invoking an analogy between patent rights and tangible
property.18 Property looms large in our civic imagination, and it is
hard to overestimate the rhetorical force of the analogy. The comparison of property and patents has tended to correspond with patent
14

Id.
See id. at 8, 10–11.
16
See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 11 (2008) (arguing that intellectual property is an “unnecessary evil” “[b]ecause there
is no evidence that intellectual monopoly achieves the desired purpose of increasing innovation and creation”).
17
To combat patent assertion, many commentators have focused on the issue of bad
patents. Bad patents are those that are either too broadly claimed or too vaguely defined
or that cover obvious inventions. These bad patents, the argument goes, are especially
dangerous in the hands of patent trolls. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE 6–11 (2008). In addition to breadth, many commentators also worry about the
sheer number of patents granted, a flood that threatens our information economy with the
specter of ever-increasing patent assertion. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 58–78 (2008); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). Though these issues are
certainly important parts of the patent troll story, the problems with patents go deeper
than overly liberal examination at the Patent and Trademark Office. There is evidence,
for example, that patent assertion entities are not just focusing on bad patents. In a recent
survey, Michael Risch showed that many patents that are asserted are, by all accounts, good
patents whose validity is hard to impugn. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 457, 478–84 (2012). This suggests that the problems with patents may well be
deeper and more structural.
18
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (“The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may
withhold a knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and
benefits which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public his invention.”(quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent
Infringement: The Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 295, 305 n.44 (2008) (proposing a solution to patent infringement by analogizing
between patent rights and real property rights).
15
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absolutism and with efforts to discredit patent reform.19 With the
property analogy in hand, opponents portray proposed patent reforms as inconsistent with the sanctity of private ownership.20
The tendency to make a quick move from a comparison between
property and patent law to the conclusion that patents must be absolute is exemplified in the Supreme Court’s 1908 case of Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.21 In that case, the Court held,
among other things, that—just as with the owners of tangible property—patent owners enjoy an unlimited right not to use their patents.22 The Court stated that “patents are property, and entitled to
the same rights and sanctions as other property.”23 Because the invention is the inventor’s “absolute property,” the inventor “may withhold
a knowledge of it from the public.”24 Armed with this kind of rhetoric, patent law has developed rigid views of infringement and, importantly for this Article, remedies. To remedy infringement, courts have
granted injunctions as a “general rule”25 and damages for all but the

19
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1009–11
(2007) (criticizing as mistaken “the historical assumption that patents and other intellectual property rights are being ‘propertized’ today. The expansion in patent rights today is
in accord with the similarly expansive development in patent rights under the guiding
influence of natural rights philosophy in the early nineteenth century.”).
20
See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (arguing that failure to appreciate patents as property and
to protect patents with property rules will frustrate the purpose of the patent system); cf.
Milgrim, supra note 18, at 303 (defending the current patent system by invoking the
Founding Fathers’ conception of patents).
21
210 U.S. 405 (1908). Though Continental Paper Bag is the most prominent case
discussing the connection between patent and property, the substantive use of the analogy
to decide cases existed long before 1908. See, e.g., Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
646, 673–74, 676 (1846) (allowing the executor of a deceased patentee a patent extension
because “[t]he law has thus impressed upon [a patent] all the qualities and characteristics
of property, for the specified period; and has enabled him to hold and deal with it the
same as in case of any other description of property belonging to him, and on his death it
passes, with the rest of his personal estate, to his [l]egal representatives, and becomes part
of the assets”). Similarly, Continental Paper Bag was not the last such case from the Supreme
Court. In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, the Supreme Court cited to Continental Paper Bag
with approval, stating that “[t]his Court has consistently held that failure . . . to make use of
a patented invention does not affect the validity of the patent.” 324 U.S. 370, 378–79
(1945). But in contrast to the dissent by Justice Harlan in Continental Paper Bag, Justice
Douglas’s dissent, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, urged that “it is time to be rid of
[the rule from Continental Paper Bag]. It is inconsistent with the Constitution and the patent legislation which Congress has enacted.” Id. at 381 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
22
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 423–24.
23
Id. at 425.
24
Id. at 424 (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897)).
25
See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT J. GOLDMAN, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 223
(7th ed. 2011) (summarizing the state of patent law just prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay).
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most remote consequences of infringement.26 Recently, the Supreme
Court has weakened the presumption that injunctions should always
issue against patent infringers,27 but absolutist impulses remain, especially within the law of patent damages.28
The patent assertion business model is greatly enhanced by a robust right not to use. Continental Paper Bag granted patent holders
that right, and it used the analogy with property to justify it.29 By
granting patent owners an absolute right not to use—with no obligation either to manufacture the invention or license the invention to
those who could30—Continental Paper Bag enabled entities to engage
in naked patent assertion without being encumbered by the harder
and riskier task of actually attempting to deliver the useful invention
to the public.31
Because of the association between the property analogy and patent absolutism, many commentators have tried to resist absolutist conceptions of patent rights by arguing against comparing patents with
property.32 A lively debate has ensued over whether patents are property.33 This Article cannot hope to settle that dispute once and for all.
Instead, our goal is substantially more modest: to show that, contrary
26
See id. at 239 n.111 (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544–47
(Fed. Cir. 1995)) (giving examples of but-for consequences of infringement that are too
remote for compensation, including “an inventor’s heart attack and a patent-owning corporation’s loss of value in its common stock”).
27
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006).
28
See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544–47.
29
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[I]t is the
privilege of any owner of property to use or not use [one’s property], without question of
motive.” (citing Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 546 (1902)).
30
For a discussion of the distinction between licensing the patent and licensing the
invention, see infra notes 62–77 and accompanying text. See also Oskar Liivak, Establishing
an Island of Patent Sanity 14–15 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 13-06, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2205996 (distinguishing between two critically different types of patent-related
licensing: licensing that mediates exchange of the invention and licensing that mediates
exchange of only a naked promise not to sue).
31
See 210 U.S. at 422–30; see also Liivak, supra note 30, at 15 (noting the increased
investments to acquire patents rather than engage in invention).
32
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1071–72 (2005) (weighing the pros and cons of treating intellectual property
through tort law instead of the property paradigm); infra notes 103–08 and accompanying
text.
33
See generally Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement, 30
REGULATION 36, 38 (2007) (arguing that tangible property and intellectual property “derive from different philosophical foundations”); Richard A. Epstein, Response, The Property
Rights Movement and Intellectual Property, 30 REGULATION 58 (2008) (responding directly to
Menell and arguing that parity exists between tangible and intellectual property); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113 (1990)
(noting various congruencies between traditional property and intellectual property); Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
715, 715 (1993) (arguing that the analogy to real property is not particularly important).
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to Continental Paper Bag, exploring the connections between patent
and property law does not lend itself to an unqualified right not to use
within patent law. To the contrary, the limits on nonuse at work
within property law may actually help patent lawyers identify sound
strategies for combatting the harmful nonuse represented by patent
trolls.
Though the law of tangible property does recognize owners as
possessing a right not to use property, that right is not without constraints. Within the law of tangible property, a number of doctrines
hem in the right not to use and are aimed at ensuring that an owner’s
nonuse of her property does not harm others, particularly by interfering with those others’ ability to use and enjoy their own property or by
inducing them to waste time or effort appropriating the unused property.34 Where the right not to use is recognized by tangible property
law, there are strong, overlapping normative justifications for it that
are ultimately rooted in tangible property’s rivalrous consumption
and are therefore not obviously relevant to patent owners.35 Far from
suggesting that the right not to use a patent should be absolute, taking
seriously the notion that patents are property supports a far more
qualified right not to use than the nearly absolute one endorsed by
Continental Paper Bag. For reasons we will discuss, the case against a
right not to use in patent is particularly strong when nonusing owners
invoke patents against independent inventors. Consequently, we will
argue, unless the holder of the patent is actually practicing the invention, remedies for patent infringement against independent inventors
should be significantly softer than they would be in other successful
patent infringement actions, possibly even de minimis.
Although in this Article we keep our focus narrowly fixed on the
right not to use and its role in facilitating patent assertion, we do not
want to ignore the larger patent-property debate. In undertaking this
exploration of the right not to use, we hope to make a broader point
as well. We think that it is possible for patent law to learn important
and valuable lessons by engaging in a serious and informed way with
the law of tangible property. Rather than necessarily weighing in
favor of inflexible and absolute patent rights, a sophisticated view of
patents as property and a proper use of the analogy between patent
and property can be powerful tools in support of patent reform.

34
35
ICAL

See infra Part II.
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGAGE 2 (6th ed. 2012).
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AND THE

In discussing the right not to use intellectual property, our focus
will be on the law of patents. There are several reasons for this: First,
some areas of intellectual property are very forthright about refusing
to recognize a right not to use. Most obviously, trademark law requires continuous use to avoid having the trademark fall back into the
public domain.36 Similarly, in some states, publicity rights are
deemed to terminate at the death of the celebrity if they are not actively exploited during the celebrity’s lifetime.37 Second, the importance of nonuse is lessened where the exclusion right conferred by
intellectual property law is less robust. In copyright, for example, independent creation is protected against infringement actions,38 and
so the owner’s nonuse of the copyrighted material has fewer consequences for the freedom of other creators than if the material were
patented.39 Copyright goes beyond this protection of independent invention and excuses some copying of parts of the copyrighted work
through the doctrine of fair use.40
In contrast, patent law—at least under Continental Paper Bag—recognizes an unqualified right not to use41 and combines that protection with other features that enhance the constraints and costs nonuse
imposes on nonowners. Unlike copyright, patent does not protect independent inventors from infringement liability.42 So, unlike copy36
Trademark abandonment occurs “[w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent
not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2012).
37
1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2B.04(3)
(Karin Green ed., rev. 82d ed. 2012) (describing a “minority view” with “trademark overtones” where the right of publicity “is inheritable only if the name and likeness of the
individual were commercially exploited during the individual’s lifetime. If they were not,
the right dies with the individual”).
38
See 3-12 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.11(D)(1) (2012).
39
But see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2013) (describing some of the features of copyright law
that facilitate the operation of “copyright trolls”).
40
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
41
See 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
42
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 35, at 29–30; Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne
Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535
(2002). Compare Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that the originality requirement of copyright requires “only that the work was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity”) with Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23, 29–30
(1997) (finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents even though the patent
infringer did not learn of the patent until after it had begun manufacturing the patented
product).
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right, not only can an owner choose not to use the invention, the
owner can also sue to prevent others from using it (or its equivalents),
even if they (re)discover the invention on their own.43 Moreover, unlike copyright, patent lacks a doctrine of fair use.44 And other potential safeguards in patent law, like a research use exemption,45 have
been interpreted so narrowly that they are practically nonexistent.46
For these reasons, the stakes regarding the right not to use are higher
for patent than for other sorts of intellectual property. In discussing
the right not to use in patent, however, many of the normative considerations at work will be equally applicable to other forms of intellectual property.
A. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
The Continental Paper Bag case grew out of a classic example of
patent suppression. Both the Continental Paper Bag Company and
the Eastern Paper Bag Company manufactured, not surprisingly, paper bags.47 The machines that could efficiently form the bags were
central to their manufacturing efforts.48 The Eastern Paper Bag Company purchased a patent on an improved machine, but it did not use
that machine or license anyone else to do so.49 It perceived the patented invention to constitute a superior method of manufacturing
bags, one that (if practiced by a competitor) might cut into its profits.50 By purchasing the patent and suppressing the invention, it
hoped to protect the costs it had sunk into developing the machines it
was already using.51
Continental started using a machine that arguably infringed Eastern’s patent on the improved machine.52 The trial court found that
Eastern Paper Bag’s patent was valid and that Continental’s machine
43

See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 23, 29–30; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 42, at

535.
44
Though proposals have been made that it should have one. See generally Maureen
A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000)
(arguing that patent law should adopt a doctrine of fair use similar to that of copyright to
address market failures currently arising under the patent system).
45
See generally Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 619–20 (1985) (explaining the origins of the
research use exception in Justice Story’s opinion in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600), and subsequent history of the exception).
46
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (articulating that
only a “very narrow form” of the experimental use defense persists).
47
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 406, 427–28 (1908).
48
See id. at 406, 428–29.
49
Id. at 407, 427–28.
50
Id. at 428–29 (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 744 (1st
Cir. 1906) (Aldrich, J., dissenting)).
51
Id.
52
See id. at 416.
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infringed it.53 It granted Eastern Paper Bag injunctive relief.54 The
Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against Continental, despite
the fact that Eastern had no intention either to use or license the
claimed invention.55 Without a reasonable explanation for the nonuse (e.g., lack of means to use the technology), the dissenting circuit
judge had concluded that Eastern was just protecting its sunk costs
and was suppressing the invention to avoid the possibility that the resulting competition would render those older machines obsolete.56
“[G]ranting all this,” the Supreme Court still sided with Eastern.57 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court made two related points. First, the
Court held that “patents are property, and entitled to the same rights
and sanctions as other property.”58 The Court then went further, stating that, because an invention is the “absolute property” of the inventor, “[h]e may withhold a knowledge of it from the public, and he may
insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute promises
to him.”59 Those benefits included the right not to practice the
patent.
The Court reasoned that exclusion in this case was “the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”60
A patent holder’s “title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect to private property that he is neither
bound to use his discovery himself or permit others to use it.”61 In
other words, patents are property, and the law does not obligate owners to use their property. Therefore, the owners of patents, like the
owners of any other kind of property, have no obligation to use or
license the underlying invention.

53

Id. at 407, 416.
Id. at 407.
55
Id. at 429–30.
56
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 150 F. at 744 (Aldrich, J., dissenting) (“There is no pretense in
this case that equitable aid is asked to protect from infringement the patent the plaintiff is
using in its business. In the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, the relief sought is injunction protection to a business or an industry built up in using a particular invention,
and through acquiring and holding in deliberate nonuse a competing invention by way of
protection.”).
57
Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 428–30.
58
Id. at 425.
59
Id. at 424.
60
Id. at 429.
61
Id. at 425 (quoting Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902)).
54
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B. Patent Trolls, Licensing the Invention, and Licensing the
Patent
Although the patent troll phenomenon has led some commentators to criticize the patent system as a whole,62 patent assertion entities
rely on a particular type of transaction. A patent is granted to an inventor who has developed a new, nonobvious invention.63 In layman’s
terms, the nonobvious invention is a completed solution to some technical problem,64 a solution that the public does not yet have65 and
that it cannot very easily develop.66 Once issued, the patent grants the
inventor the exclusive rights to decide who “makes, uses, offers to
sell, . . . sells, . . . or imports . . . [the] patented invention.”67 Those
rights enable inventors to engage in two types of transactions: ex ante
and ex post.68 For ex ante transactions, the inventor, or the inventor’s
assignees, approaches potential users of the patented invention and
offers the invention to them.69 If the invention is useful and the parties can find mutually agreeable terms, the inventor transfers the invention to the user along with a license to the patent’s exclusive
rights. In an ex ante transaction, the contract transfers useful technology from the inventor (or the assignee) to a user.70 These transactions, better described as licensing of the invention, are not the focus
of patent assertion entities.
The other type, ex post transactions, are different. They transfer
only a promise not to sue with no transfer of the invention.71 In these
transactions, negotiation is between the patent holder and an infringer who has already gained access to the patented invention. Importantly, American patent law does not distinguish between
62
See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 1 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf (arguing that the measurable benefits of the patent
system are outweighed by its economic costs).
63
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
64
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the
Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2012) (discussing the
purpose and interplay between 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112).
65
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
66
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
67
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
68
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 7–8, 31–72 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.
69
See id. at 31–48.
70
See id. See generally Liivak, supra note 30; Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of
Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1477, 1499 (2005); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001)
(drawing a conceptual picture of a “normal” market transaction where goods are exchanged and where the legal rights that protect those goods automatically move with the
goods).
71
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 68, at 49–72.
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independent inventors and copyists.72 As a result, even when someone obtains access to the invention by independently inventing it without knowledge of the patent’s existence, a patent holder can still sue
for infringement.73 Indeed, as we will discuss at greater length below,
it is the liability of independent inventors for patent infringement that
makes ex post transactions potentially very lucrative for patent trolls.74
With these ex post transactions, there is no transfer of the technology
itself, as the licensee is already actively using the invention. The ex
post transaction transfers only a bare promise not to sue. This is a
“license” of the patent, but it is fundamentally different from licensing
the invention.75 This ex post type of transaction is the principal focus
of the patent assertion business model.76
The user in an ex post transaction does not get any useful technology. She just gets relief from a legal threat. If the infringement is
willful and the infringer copied from the original inventor, this kind
of ex post transaction constitutes an important part of the patent
owner’s legal protection, and it seems legitimate. But where an independent inventor inadvertently infringes a patent, the tactic looks and
feels to many like a shakedown.77 This is especially true where the
patent owner is not otherwise using the patent or actively seeking to
license the invention. And the tactic is most troubling of all where the
owner consciously chooses to wait for the infringement to mature in
order to extract maximum leverage from the inadvertent infringer.
Two features of patent law are particularly important to the possibility of naked, ex post patent assertion as a viable profit-seeking activ72

See MERGES ET AL., supra note 35, at 29; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 42, at 535.
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 35, at 29; see, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23, 29–30 (1997).
74
The ability to sue independent inventors is highly controversial. See infra note 92
and accompanying text. And, though it is outside the scope of this Article, that ability may
be necessary to protect the inventor’s exclusive position for ex ante transactions. In other
words, when focusing only on ex ante transactions, the patent system and its exclusive
rights can be seen as protecting the inventor’s position as the sole and exclusive supplier of
the invention to the public. To maintain that position, and to avoid redundant expenditures of research and development, it may make sense for the patent system to recognize a
right to sue independent inventors (especially where the second arriving independent inventor intends to distribute the invention itself) as long as the patent holder is actually making
efforts to disseminate the invention itself.
75
For this reason, care should be taken in clearly distinguishing licensing of the invention from licensing of the patent. Unfortunately, patent law has generally blurred any
distinction between the invention and the legal rights granted by a patent. In patent discussions, licensing of the invention is used synonymously with licensing of the patent. This
is not to say that, in practice, the two categories are always easy to distinguish from one
another. But the conceptual distinction remains an important one to keep in mind.
76
See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2111–12 (2007).
77
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2008–09 (2007).
73
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ity. First, as we just observed, patent infringement does not require
copying by the defendant. For infringement, the law simply asks
whether the defendant is making, using, or selling the claimed invention.78 As stated by the Supreme Court, “intent [of the defendant]
plays no role” in infringement.79 And indeed, plaintiffs rarely allege
that copying is intentional in patent infringement lawsuits.80 Often, as
technological opportunities emerge, many people independently invent the same (or nearly the same) invention at nearly the same time.
Examples of such simultaneous invention are quite easy to find.81
Leibniz and Newton famously invented calculus independently of one
another at around the same time.82 Sawyer, Man, Swan, and Edison
were all working toward incandescent light bulbs at the same time.83
And Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray were working toward the
telephone at the same time.84 Yet, the patent system grants only one
inventor the patent over the invention.85 When any other inventors
make or use the invention, they are infringing the patent, even
though they came up with the invention on their own and did not
copy or rely on the work of the patent holder.
The second critical feature for patent assertion is the fact that,
under Continental Paper Bag, the patent holder is under no obligation
to practice the invention.86 A patent holder is not required to manufacture the invention or even to plan to do so. Nor does the patent
holder need to license anyone else to manufacture the invention.87
The patent holder can quietly, and relatively cheaply, sit on the patent
and wait for others to infringe it. Though many patent holders do
78

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997).
80
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1443 (2009) (reporting that only 10.9% of patent complaints examined in the study
alleged copying). Though not necessary for infringement allegations, copying can be
quite significant for the award of treble damages for willful infringement. See, e.g., 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
81
See D. LAMB & S.M. EASTON, MULTIPLE DISCOVERY xi–xii (1984) (listing numerous
instances of near simultaneous invention including: the jet engine, electric light, phonograph, color photography, kinetic theory of gases, analytic geometry, infinitesimal calculus,
and quantum mechanics).
82
For a thorough account of the story, see generally A. RUPERT HALL, PHILOSOPHERS
AT WAR (1980).
83
See ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY 50–56 (1949).
84
See EDWIN S. GROSVENOR & MORGAN WESSON, ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL 45–49
(1997); LAMB & EASTON, supra note 81, at 80–85.
85
See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 42, at 535, 541.
86
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908).
87
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006); see also F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 1048 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Continental Paper Bag to support the proposition that failure to license would be protected even absent 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)).
79

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-6\CRN605.txt

1450

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

11-SEP-13

15:16

[Vol. 98:1437

practice their inventions, they are under no obligation to do so in
order to enforce their patents according to Continental Paper Bag.
Together these two features of patent law combine to enable patent assertion. In fact, the practice is extremely lucrative.88 Simply asserting patents is arguably easier and more profitable than the risky
undertaking of inventing and commercializing technology. In a survey, one entrepreneur depressingly noted that in today’s climate, it is
“a no brainer”89 to focus on patent assertion. “Investing in invention
is for schmucks.”90 Though patent assertion entities do have their defenders,91 it is hard to understand any functioning patent system
where the necessary and challenging job of invention and commercialization takes the back seat to pursuing patents and infringement
actions alone.
During the past few years, multiple scholars within the disciplines
of both economics and law have actively questioned the wisdom of the
first of these critical features—the patent liability of independent inventors.92 These proposals have met with varying levels of criticism.93
For example, prominent intellectual property lawyer Roger Milgrim
88
See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328–31 (2010) (discussing licensing revenue received by various patent assertion entities).
89
Chien, supra note 10, at 19–20 (quoting Nicholas White, Comment to Joff Wild,
Now That IP Is Mainstream, Let’s Not Mess This Once in a Lifetime Opportunity Up, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT. (July 9, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=
b0610bab-d371-4401-bd6f-6b12368b8eb0).
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 189–90 (2006)
(“[P]atent trolls actually benefit society.”).
92
See Manfredi La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. ECON. REV.
1427, 1437 (1989) (advocating a “permissive” patent regime where the PTO would “accept[ ] all applications up to the date of the award of a patent to the earliest inventor of a
given class of new products/processes”); Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in
Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1652–53 (2010); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 42, at
535–36 (“[W]e discuss industrial environments in which the best rule is to allow a defence
of independent invention.”); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 95
(2006) (describing the “attractive properties” of granting independent inventors use
rights); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 475, 479 (2006) (proposing to bestow “a defense to patent infringement on the
independent inventor(s)”); John S. Liebovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System,
111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2279–81 (2002) (arguing for co-ownership of patent by independent
inventors); see also Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of
Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 223–24 (2007) (discussing independent invention
in the narrower confines of patents claiming purified and isolated naturally occurring gene
sequences).
93
See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 812–13 (2002) (commenting on Scotchmer and
Maurer’s proposal: “[t]he limitations imposed by the model’s assumptions suggest extreme
caution in deriving any practical policy recommendations from it”); Lemley, supra note 9,
1526–32; Milgrim, supra note 18, 295–97 (suggesting that such academic proposals are in
need of “adult supervision”).
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entitled one response to these proposals An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement: The Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone
Listen? 94 Milgrim argued that suggestions to protect independent inventors indicate a need for “adult supervision” of scholars and that
such protection would threaten to “eviscerat[e]” a patent owners’
right to exclude.95 Milgrim drew heavily on the analogy to real property, noting how “valued . . . the protections for real property are in
this country” and arguing that reforms, if needed, are better served by
creative remedies rather than unilateral modification of the right to
exclude.96 The idea of a defense against patent infringement claims
for independent inventors remains controversial.97
The possibility of discouraging patent assertion by introducing an
obligation to practice inventions has received less attention. By definition, however, a patent assertion entity is not actively licensing or manufacturing the underlying invention to those that can utilize it prior to
identifying potential acts of infringement. Instead, patent assertion
entities merely seek infringers in order to demand money in exchange for the promise not to sue.98 Their activity is facilitated by the
lack of an obligation for patentees to manufacture, license, or otherwise disseminate their patented invention. Changing the law in a way
that discourages nonuse would therefore make it more difficult to
build a business around mere patent assertion. Importantly, this feature of patent law is not expressly spelled out in the patent statutes.99
Yet, because of Continental Paper Bag,100 the existence of the right has
long been treated as a settled question within patent law. But the
Court’s willingness to reconsider in eBay what Continental Paper Bag
had to say about the availability of injunctive relief suggests that the
time may be ripe to do the same with nonuse.101
One way to challenge Continental Paper Bag’s holding with regard
to the right not to use is to reject the Court’s reliance on a facile
analogy between patent and tangible property. Historically, both
94

Milgrim, supra note 18.
Id. at 296, 303. In addition, as a practical matter, a defense for independent inventors sits uncomfortably with patent law’s novelty requirement. See Liivak, Rethinking the
Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, supra note 92, at 1680–84; see also Blair & Cotter, supra
note 93, at 819 (pointing out problems with the independent discovery defense).
96
Milgrim, supra note 18, at 305 n.44, 307.
97
Though note that with the passage of the America Invents Act, U.S. patent law now
has widely applicable prior user rights. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 5(a), 125 Stat. 297 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (Supp. V
2011)); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE
1–4, 7 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_
report.pdf.
98
See Liivak, supra note 30, at 14.
99
See generally 35 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (setting forth federal patent law).
100
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429–30 (1908).
101
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
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courts and commentators have tended to use the comparison between
patent rights and tangible property to promote absolutist conceptions
of patent rights.102 Consequently, many commentators interested in
resisting absolutist conceptions of patent rights have argued against
treating patents as property. Their argument has been that, properly
distinguished from tangible property, patents would no longer operate under the spell of Blackstone’s sole and despotic dominion.
Leading the charge against treating patents (and intellectual
property generally) as property is Mark Lemley, who has argued that
“treating intellectual property as ‘just like’ real property is a mistake as
a practical matter.”103 In fact, his worries about the analogy between
intellectual property and property run so deep that he suggests using
the term “IP” instead of “intellectual property” in hopes that we might
“forget” this problematic association.104 We can perhaps do better,
Lemley suggests, if we conceptualize “IP” as a “tort,”105 as “a government-created subsidy,”106 or as “government regulation.”107 He
doubts that we “need an analogy at all” and posits that “[i]ntellectual
property has come of age; it no longer needs to turn to some broader
area of legal theory to seek legitimacy. The economics of intellectual
property law should focus on the economic characteristics of intellectual property rights . . . .”108
On the other hand, some scholars, even some who agree with
Lemley’s push to soften protection of intellectual property, conclude,
like Stewart Sterk, that “[i]t is far too late to expunge the rhetoric of
property from dialogue about [intellectual property].”109 John Duffy
has stated, in response to Lemley, that
intellectual property should be treated as a species of property.
More is at stake here than mere semantics, for keeping intellectual
property isolated impoverishes both intellectual property scholarship and more general property rights theories. A unified theory of
property—one broad enough to account for the similarities and differences among species of property as diverse as Blackacre and pat102
See, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 425 (“[I]t was decided that patents are
property, and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property . . . .”); Mossoff,
supra note 19, at 1009–11.
103
Lemley, supra note 32, at 1031–32.
104
Id. at 1075.
105
Id. at 1072.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1073.
108
Id. at 1075.
109
Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between Land and
Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 469 (2005). Professor Sterk focused particularly on copyright law, but his broader argument is equally applicable to other forms of intellectual
property.
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ents—promises to increase rather than to diminish our
understanding of property and intellectual property.110

We agree with Sterk and Duffy. The insights to be gleaned from a
careful study of property law are powerful tools that we should not
ignore.111 And this embrace of the analogy does not entail an endorsement of patent absolutism. Indeed, unmoored from the complexity and qualification that have developed within the law of
property over centuries of trial and error, patent theory might well be
even more likely to move in ever more absolutist directions. Although
he has been a forceful voice against the property analogy, Lemley has
said that he continues to hold out some hope that “it might be possible to rehabilitate the property analogy”112 to intellectual property. At
least in part, the rest of this Article is an attempt to do exactly that.
II
THE RIGHT NOT TO USE IN THE LAW
TANGIBLE PROPERTY

OF

As a descriptive matter, the Court’s assertion in Continental Paper
Bag about how the law of tangible property treats the right not to use
vastly oversimplifies the situation. In this section, we will briefly discuss the law of tangible property as it relates to nonuse and explore
some of the normative considerations that may help explain and justify why property law treats nonuse the way it does. We will later turn
to the domain of intellectual property to see whether the law of nonuse within the law of tangible property has anything useful to contribute to the discussion of the nonuse in patent law.
A. The Right Not to Use and the Right to Exclude
Because of the controversy over patent trolls, the right not to use
has received more attention in patent law circles than it has within the
commentary on tangible property. This disregard of the right not to
use in tangible property is probably due at least in part to a tendency
to subsume the right not to use within the right to exclude, which has
been the subject of a great deal of discussion among property scholars
in recent years.113 Although the right to exclude indirectly protects
110
John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2005).
111
Others have also looked within traditional property law for limits on patents. See
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1,
106–27 (2004); Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 175, 202–20 (2011); Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 112–20 (2009).
112
Lemley, supra note 32, at 1069.
113
See Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. WATCH 255,
255–56 (2011).
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use (and nonuse) rights, the two are conceptually distinct and the
right to use is usually understood to be normatively more fundamental.114 As James Penner has put it, “[n]o one has any interest in
merely excluding others from things, for any reason or no reason at
all. The interest that underpins the right to property is the interest we
have in purposefully dealing with things.”115
The distinction between the right not to use and the right to exclude is particularly clear with respect to land. We can easily imagine
a situation in which landowners lack the discretion to determine the
timing of some particular use or development of their land but retain
a right to exclude, or in which they retain discretion over timing of
use but enjoy only a very qualified right to exclude. In colonial North
America, for example, local laws frequently obligated owners to actively and continuously use their land on the penalty of forfeiture.116
Such an affirmative obligation to use the land, however, was perfectly
consistent with those owners continuing to be able to exclude nonowners as long as the former retained ownership of the land. In
contrast, owners of land in Sweden, and other parts of Scandinavia,
have wide discretion to determine whether or when to develop their
land. But they have very limited rights to exclude nonowners from
their land except where their active use decisions require it, such as
when exclusion from part of the property is necessary to prevent physical damage or to protect the privacy of occupied dwellings.117
Recognizing broad exclusion rights is one way of preventing
others from undermining the right to control use or nonuse.118
Where an item of property can only support one use, however, the
right not to use (or the right to wait to use) converges as a practical
matter with the right to exclude. In those situations, the two rights
become largely interchangeable. Where more than one use is possible—as with land—the answer to the nonuse question has the potential to diverge from the owner’s right to exclude and sometimes does,
as in Swedish property law.
114
See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–104 (1997); Larissa Katz,
Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 315 (2008); Henry E.
Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012).
115
PENNER, supra note 114, at 70–71.
116
See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–63 (1996). Homesteaders seeking to take title under
the Homestead Act were under a similar obligation to cultivate or improve their land even
while enjoying whatever right to exclude they enjoyed by virtue of the law of trespass. See
Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
117
See Kevin T. Colby, Public Access to Private Land—Allemansrätt in Sweden, 15 LANDSCAPING & URB. PLAN. 253, 254–55 (1988); see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M.
PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 4 (2012) (describing the allemansrätt).
118
See Smith, supra note 114, at 1693–94.
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It is plausible, as Henry Smith has argued in numerous contexts,
that there are sometimes second-order reasons (relating to such considerations as information and administrative costs) for affirming that
owners have a presumptive right to exclude others (and thereby to
prevent those others from making some use of an unused “thing”)
even where it would seem to be preferable (on some normative
ground) to recognize a nonowner’s right to use the property over an
owner’s objection.119 Indeed, this is what property law seems to do in
the many jurisdictions that, at least formally, are willing to enjoin trespass without requiring proof of harm by owners.120 We will consider
the relevance of such indirect reasons for protecting patent nonuse in
Part III. Our immediate purpose, however, is simply to clarify the conceptual distinction between nonuse and exclusion, to describe the law
of property as it relates narrowly to the right not to use, and to suggest
some of the normative considerations that might explain the shape
the law assumes.
B. The Right Not to Use
It is, strictly speaking, true to say (as the Court did in Continental
Paper Bag)121 that the law of tangible property permits owners to
choose not to use their property. Left unqualified, however, this statement is extremely misleading because it ignores substantial limitations
that the law of property imposes on owners’ nonuse of tangible property. The law does not hesitate to penalize owners for nonuse where
that nonuse harms third parties and, in particular, where it harms the
interest that those parties have in use and possession of their own
property. It is true that motive is by and large irrelevant in property
law’s treatment of nonuse. Both harmless and harmful nonuse can
result from unsavory motives, such as spite or the desire to suppress
competition, or from motives most would regard as praiseworthy, such
as the desire to conserve a piece of land in its natural state. Although
it does not inquire into motives, the law focuses a great deal of attention on the manner in which owners go about not using their tangible
property to ensure that they do not harm others in the process.
Property law uses many disparate doctrines to accomplish this
goal. A handful, however, seem particularly relevant to the ability of
owners to decline to use their property. These are, among others,
abandonment; undue hardship and estoppel as they relate to inno119
See id.; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements
in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1780 (2007) (“[T]he simplicity and information-hiding
function of exclusion rights allow officials and other nonowners to interact with the owner
in the simplest of ways.”).
120
See Newman, supra note 111, at 67.
121
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, at 424, 429–30 (1908).
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cent improvers; nuisance; permissive waste; adverse possession; and
necessity. As a practical matter, we will need to discuss these individual doctrines separately. But, in understanding the right not to use
within tangible property law, it is important not to fixate narrowly on
one particular doctrine or another. Nor are we describing these doctrines in order to argue for a one-to-one translation of each from the
context of tangible property into patent law. Considered by itself, any
particular doctrine can be more or less demanding of owners. From
the standpoint of attempting to understand the owner’s effective right
not to use, however, we are interested in understanding the dimensions of the zone of discretion that remains in the wake of all of these
doctrines working in concert and in isolating the common principles,
if any, that lie behind them. Once we have described these doctrines
in more detail, we will turn to the equally important question of why
the law of tangible property might ever protect the power of owners to
(attentively) not use their property.
ABANDONMENT
American property law does not permit owners to abandon ownership of land.122 Although the law is often characterized as granting
the owners of chattels the unilateral power to sever their ties of ownership to an item of personal property,123 abandonment law operates in
practice more like a variant of estoppel. That is, in conflicts between
an owner and a subsequent possessor, an owner who is deemed to
have abandoned a piece of property will not be able to recover possession of the abandoned property from the person who has appropriated it in the interim or from someone who acquired the property
from the appropriator.124
Typically, courts describe abandonment as occurring when an
owner relinquishes possession of a chattel with the intention of foregoing any future claim to it.125 Because it is almost always impossible
to prove subjective intent, particularly when, as in most abandonment
cases, the original owner will likely deny the intent to abandon in an
effort to (re)claim valuable property, the objective circumstances surrounding an owner’s relinquishment of possession of the abandoned
122
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191,
199–200 (2010) (“[T]he common law flatly prohibits the legal abandonment of the fee
simple interest in land.”); see also, e.g., Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d,
233, 236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“Perfect title, under Pennsylvania law, cannot be
abandoned.”).
123
See Peñalver, supra note 122, at 196.
124
See id. at 196–97 (explaining the importance of manifestation of intent for an individual seeking to abandon a chattel). For a somewhat different take on the law of abandonment, see generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355,
360 (2010) (describing abandonment as a power that owners enjoy unilaterally to sever
their ties to their property).
125
See Peñalver, supra note 122, at 197.
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item are usually decisive. In other words, appearances and context
matter. Courts will deem an owner to have abandoned a chattel
where the owner gives up possession of it under circumstances suggestive of an intent to forgo future claims.126
Thus, although courts ritualistically repeat the formulaic reassurance that mere nonuse, by itself, does not amount to abandonment,
they appear to have in mind a kind of attentive nonuse that does not
suggest to others the existence of an intent to relinquish future ownership claims. In contrast, inattentive or derelict nonuse creates the appearance of an intent to abandon and will therefore often count as
abandonment. Thus, for example, the law of abandonment requires
owners of property who have lost possession of it to make active efforts
to locate and recover that property in order to maintain a good claim
on the property.127 A subsequent possessor who relies on the message
communicated by protracted and derelict nonuse of a chattel will
likely prevail against an attempt by the original owner to reassert ownership rights.128
The link between nonuse and abandonment is even more explicit
within western water law. Within water law, courts often purport to
adhere to the traditional common law definition of abandonment.
Thus, they describe the doctrine as providing for abandonment only
when nonuse is “coupled with an intent to abandon.”129 But, crucially, “intent to abandon a water right may be inferred through the
circumstances of a case, and need not be proved directly.”130 And,
“[c]ontinued and unexplained nonuse of a water right for an unreasonable period of time creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to

126
See id. at 192 (“Simply put, the law is said to empower owners of chattels to abandon
them by unambiguously manifesting the intent to do so . . . .”).
127
This feature of abandonment law coheres with the “discovery rule” approach to
adverse possession of chattels. See O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980). Some
states reject the discovery rule in favor of a “demand and refusal rule” that is more protective of original owners. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d
426, 429–30 (N.Y. 1991).
128
See, e.g., Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452,
456 (E.D. Va. 1960) (“For a period of 66 years the derelict vessel and her cargo have remained in the exact location. While lapse of time and nonuser are not sufficient, in and of
themselves, to constitute an abandonment, these factors may, under certain circumstances,
give rise to an implication of intention to abandon.”).
129
Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 552 (Colo. 2000); accord Okanogan
Wilderness League, Inc. v. Town of Twisp, 947 P.2d 732, 738 (Wash. 1997) (“Abandonment is the intentional relinquishment of a water right.”); see also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF
WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:89 (2012) (“Abandonment is defined as the intentional
relinquishment of a known right . . . .”).
130
Haystack Ranch, LLC, 997 P.2d at 552; accord Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc., 947
P.2d at 739 (“[T]here should be a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon from long
periods of nonuse.”).
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abandon.”131 Some western jurisdictions go even further than this,
however, and deem water rights abandoned if unused, irrespective of
intent. Wyoming’s water rights statute, for example, states:
Where the holder of an appropriation of water from a surface,
underground or reservoir water source fails, either intentionally or
unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an adjudicated
or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all
water rights and privileges appurtenant thereto.132

INNOCENT IMPROVERS
As abandonment cases and statutes suggest, leaving chattels unused leads to wasteful conflict by increasing the risk that nonowners
will innocently put other people’s unused property to work as if it
were their own. In the context of land, a similar scenario occurs when
a builder encroaches on the land of a neighbor, erroneously believing
it to be her own. Although this most typically occurs because of surveying errors and usually involves only a few inches or feet of land,133
the mistake can occasionally be more substantial, sometimes even
amounting to the land underneath an entire building.134
Applying the doctrine of undue hardship, courts confronted with
a conflict between an innocent encroacher and an intransigent landowner seeking to remove the encroachment may deny an injunction
forcing the encroacher to remove the encroachment if the cost of removing it would be vastly out of proportion with the injury to the landowner.135 Instead, courts will often allow the encroachment to remain
in place136 but require the encroacher to purchase the underlying
land at a price set by the court, usually measured as the value of the
unimproved land.137
Even where the entire improvement is on the land of another,
courts will normally require the encroacher to turn the improvement
131
Haystack Ranch, LLC, 997 P.2d at 552 (quoting City & County of Denver v. Snake
River Water Dist., 788 P.2d 772, 776 (Colo. 1990)); see also Okanogan Wilderness League, Inc.,
947 P.2d at 739 (observing that the “principle applies throughout arid western states which
have followed the rule that long periods of nonuse raise a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon”).
132
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-401 (2011).
133
See, e.g., Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 260 (N.J. 1969).
134
See, e.g., Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563, 563 (Fla. 1956); Hardy v. Burroughs, 232
N.W. 200, 200 (Mich. 1930); Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970);
Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 805–06 (W. Va. 1969).
135
See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
50–56 (2007).
136
See, e.g., Mannillo, 255 A.2d at 263–64.
137
See Kratze v. Indep. Order of Oddfellows, Garden City Lodge No. 11, 500 N.W.2d
115, 124 (Mich. 1993) (“The correct measure of damages is the value of the . . . strip of
land itself.”).
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over to the landowner in exchange for just compensation—with the
owner typically having to pay the improver for the value added to the
land by the improvement.138 Because of the inequitable burden this
forced sale of the improvement can place on the improver, courts will
sometimes order a transfer of ownership of the underlying land to the
improver in exchange for damages in the amount of the value of the
unimproved land139 or a suitable substitute parcel of undeveloped
land.140 Where there is evidence that an owner has intentionally
stood by while an innocent encroacher has mistakenly invested in improvements on the owner’s land in ways that are expensive to undo,
courts are particularly likely to employ estoppel to protect the interests of the innocent encroacher.141
The active use or attentive nonuse of property reduces the risk of
this kind of confusion by conveying useful information to nonowners
about ownership of the property and by alerting owners to the encroachment before the innocent improver has sunk enormous resources into the mistake.142 Thus, doctrines (such as undue
hardship) that reduce the availability of injunctive relief for innocent
encroachment or that require a forced sale of the land (or compensation to the encroacher for the value of the improvement) increase the
cost of exercising the right not to use land. Their operation creates
an incentive for owners to police their unused land and intervene
early in the event of encroachment by innocent improvers. And estoppel aims to prevent the most egregious attempts to benefit from
the mistakes caused by derelict nonuse.
NUISANCE
Owners—through their neglectful nonuse—sometimes permit
their land to become repositories for garbage or allow structures on
138
See J.E. Macy, Annotation, Measure and Items of Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly
Placed or Made on Land of Another, 24 A.L.R.2d 11, § 15 (1952); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting
Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1416 & n.59 (2009).
139
See, e.g., Somerville, 170 S.E.2d at 813.
140
See, e.g., Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563, 564–65 (Fla. 1956).
141
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS § 42 cmt. b (1937); Ollig v. Eagles, 78 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Mich. 1956) (citing “Seavey
and Scott’s Notes on Section 42 of Restatement (First) of Restitution”); see also Olin v.
Reinecke, 168 N.E. 676, 678 (Ill. 1929) (“The general rule at law is that, if a stranger enters
upon the land of another and makes an improvement by erecting a building, the building
becomes the property of the owner of the land. In equity . . . if the owner stands by and
permits another to expend money in improving his land, he may be compelled to surrender his rights to the land upon receiving compensation . . . .” (citations omitted)). A
similar doctrine can require owners to submit to the use of a right of way over their property by a neighboring landowner. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763, 766 (Ky.
1976).
142
Cf. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 77–79
(1985) (describing the common law understanding that acts of possession are a kind of
“statement”).
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their property to become dangerously dilapidated, infested with vermin, or locations for unsavory or unlawful activity. A failure to maintain one’s property that produces such consequences can constitute a
public nuisance which state officials can sue to abate.143 When those
consequences of nonuse interfere with the neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their own property, those neighbors can also sue under nuisance law for damages or injunctive relief ordering the derelict owner
to take affirmative steps to abate the nuisance.144
In the past, courts were reluctant to find visual annoyances to be
nuisances, in the absence of physical manifestations, such as foul
odors or threats to health or safety.145 Mere unsightliness, the usual
account goes, was not enough. In recent years, however, there has
been a trend in favor of recognizing visual harm as, by itself, adequate
to serve as the basis for a nuisance action.146 We do not take a position on the desirability of this move except to note that it seems consistent with the basic premises of nuisance law, particularly where
there are strong, widely shared norms against the particular type of
land use that generates the visual harm.147
In the context of nonuse, the particular sorts of unsightliness that
tend to arise with nonuse of property—tall grass, weeds, and the accumulation of garbage—are sufficiently disruptive in an urban or suburban environment that they are often singled out by local ordinances

143
See Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 652 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Regulation of
nuisance properties is at the heart of the municipal police power.”).
144
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C & cmt. e (1979) (“When the nuisance,
in addition to interfering with the public right, also interferes with the use and enjoyment
of the plaintiff’s land, it is a private nuisance as well as a public one. In this case the harm
suffered by the plaintiff is of a different kind and he can maintain an action not only on
the basis of the private nuisance itself, but also, if he chooses to do so, on the basis of the
particular harm from the public nuisance.”).
145
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 976 (7th ed. 2010) (“Courts, developing the
law of nuisance, rarely declared an ugly site a nuisance.”); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An
Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1080–87 (1970); Dix W. Noel, Note, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1–5, 8 (1939).
146
See, e.g., Rattigan v. Wile, 841 N.E.2d 680, 689 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he modern trend
is toward recognition that aesthetic considerations may legitimately generate public and
private concern.”); Foley v. Harris, 286 S.E.2d 186, 190–91(Va. 1982) (holding that unsightly junked cars on lot were a nuisance); John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50
EMORY L.J. 265, 286–87 (2001) (detecting a judicial trend in favor of recognizing aesthetic
nuisances). But see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.
L. REV. 965, 999–1000 (2004) (“[P]urely aesthetic nuisances such as parking broken cars
are almost never found at all.”). Although courts are likely to be reluctant to find nuisances on the basis of mere differences of taste, they seem to be more willing to find an
aesthetic nuisance in cases in which they view the defendant’s conduct as wrongful in some
sense. See, e.g., Rattigan, 841 N.E.2d at 688–90.
147
See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 728–29 (1973).
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for explicit prohibition as public nuisances.148 Chicago, for example,
requires owners of any building that is vacant for more than thirty
days to register the building with the city (at a fee of $250 every six
months), maintain insurance on the building, post a sign with contact
information for the owner, “[c]ut the grass, remove weeds, garbage,
debris, dead trees or any fallen limbs. . . .[,] shovel any accumulated
snow to allow public use of the adjacent sidewalk and keep the property free from pests such as rats and other rodents.”149
A court may find an owner who defies an injunction to abate a
nuisance to be in contempt and punish the owner accordingly.150
Where, for example, the owner of an apartment building decides to
keep the building vacant, she is obligated to maintain the structure in
a safe and sanitary condition.151 If she fails to do so, there may be
private liability to neighbors or, more frequently, the city may step in
and demolish the structure, the expense for which becomes a lien on
the property.152 Depending on the costs incurred by the city and the
value of the property, the nonusing owner may ultimately lose title to
the property.153
PERMISSIVE WASTE
The law of waste governs the conflicts of interest that arise between present possessors and the owners of vested future interests.
Traditionally, the most common conflicts have involved those between
the owners of life estates and those individuals holding remainders.154
Within the law of waste, courts distinguish between voluntary and permissive waste. Voluntary waste arises from a life tenant’s overuse of
the life estate in ways that impair the remainder holder’s interest in
the future enjoyment of the property.155 Permissive waste, in contrast,
“results generally from the failure of the possessor to exercise the care
of a reasonable person to preserve and protect the estate for future
interests.”156 Voluntary waste is a wrong of commission, and permissive waste is a wrong of omission. Under the doctrine of permissive
148
See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Norman, 816 So. 2d 72, 77 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)
(describing city ordinance); City of Union v. Julius, 706 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (describing city ordinance).
149
Vacant Property Guidelines, CITY OF CHI., https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/
depts/bldgs/supp_info/vacant_property_guidelines.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013); see
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13-12-125 (2013).
150
See Village of Ottawa Hills v. Afjeh, No. L-10-1353, 2012 WL 121087, at *3–5 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012).
151
See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 652–53 (5th Cir. 2001).
152
See, e.g., id.
153
See, e.g., id.
154
See KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 69–70 (3d ed.
2001).
155
See id. at 70; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 135, at 603–04.
156
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.05(2) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013).
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waste, derelict nonuse can violate the rights of others with an interest
in the property.
Examples of inactive nonuse that constitute permissive waste include allowing a pasture to become overgrown with brush where that
is inconsistent with good husbandry,157 failure to repair leaking
roofs,158 failure to replace a furnace such that a home is damaged by
freezing temperatures,159 failure to paint,160 failure to maintain gutters,161 and failure to stabilize a dilapidated structure to prevent further damage or collapse.162 Permissive waste has an obvious bearing
on the scope of a life tenant’s right not to use the property because if
that nonuse is sufficiently inattentive, the nonusing life tenant will become liable to the holder of the remainder interest and may even
forfeit the life estate.163
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The law of adverse possession imposes a very direct, though not
very demanding, requirement of attentiveness by nonusing landowners.164 To prevent adverse possession from depriving them of property, owners who opt not to use their land must remain sufficiently
involved with it to discover and oust long-term trespassers making
open and notorious use of the property. Although the doctrine has
numerous—and overlapping—normative justifications, it plainly penalizes the most severely inattentive nonuse: nonuse that sits idly by
while another person invests substantial effort in the improvement or
alteration of the property.165 This punitive aspect of adverse posses157

See Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272, 274 (1850).
See, e.g., Genesco Inc. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 577 F. Supp. 72, 85 (D.S.C.
1983), aff’d sub nom. Jaffe-Spindler Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1984); State
v. Delinquent Taxpayers (Provident Props.), No. M2004-00951-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL
3147060, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2006).
159
See, e.g., Stouter v. Bailey, 545 A.2d 98, 102 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
160
See, e.g., In re Steele, 19 N.J. Eq. 120, 120 (N.J. Ch. 1868).
161
See, e.g., Wade v. Pittsburg Mach. Tool Co., 40 Pa. Super. 365, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1909).
162
See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 70.08(b)(3)(i) (David A. Thomas ed., 2012).
163
See, e.g., Smith v. Minich, 110 S.E.2d 649, 649 (Ga. 1959) (holding that a petition
alleging extreme permissive waste was sufficient to authorize forfeiture of the life estate
and immediate possession of the premises by the holders of the remainder interests); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 138 (1936). As with waste in general, owners who create life
estates can override the law of permissive waste by stating their intent to do so. See id. § 141
cmt. a.
164
See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 816, 853 (1994) (“The owner aware of adverse possession law is motivated to place her
property in at least some minimal form of productive use.”).
165
See Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 52–53 (1837) (“It is well settled that to
constitute an adverse possession, there need not be a fence, building, or other improvement made: it suffices for this purpose, that visible and notorious acts of ownership are
exercised over the premises . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
145, at 141 (indicating that modern courts are sensitive to the “plight” of the innocent
improver).
158
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sion is particularly salient in jurisdictions like Canada that require adverse possessors to show that their use was inconsistent with the
owner’s use of the property.166 So disfavored is the egregiously derelict owner that in most jurisdictions, even a knowing trespasser-user
(i.e., a squatter) will prevail over a derelict nonusing owner after a
sufficient period of time.167
NECESSITY
The doctrine of necessity requires the owner to allow a third
party to use the owner’s property where that use is necessary to avoid
the imminent risk of serious harm.168 Compensation is typically due
to the owner only to the extent that property is consumed or damaged, and not for the mere privilege of entry or use.169 Because the
doctrine, stated baldly, does not distinguish between used and unused
property and focuses primarily on the degree of the claimant’s
need,170 it is tempting to view it as a limit on ownership as such rather
than on an owner’s right not to use. The doctrine as applied, however, takes into account the balance of burdens imposed on the property owner (from the claimant’s use of the property) and on the
claimant (from not being allowed to use the property).171 Consistent
with this approach, the Restatement says that a claimant seeking access to a dwelling under the doctrine of necessity may be required to
prove more dire need than claimants seeking access to another type of
property.172 The logic of this balancing of burdens suggests that the
doctrine of necessity will be more permissive where the person in
need is seeking the use of otherwise unused property. In a sense, the
law steers the claimant toward unused or underused property, where
it is available to meet the claimant’s need.

166
See Katz, supra note 114, at 291 n.48, 292 (citing Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), [1977]
13 O.R. 2d 680 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
167
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 145, at 132 (citing 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 15.4 (1952)); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse
Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1080 (2006). Richard Helmholz has argued that, while
formally permitting squatters to take title by adverse possession, many courts actually impose a good faith requirement. See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent,
61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 356–58 (1983). But see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and
Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1986).
168
See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (stating that the doctrine applies
“with special force” when preserving human life); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197
(1965).
169
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(2) cmt. a (1965).
170
See id. § 197.
171
See id. § 197(1) cmt. c (“In determining the question of reasonableness, the probable advantage to the actor to be expected from the entry must be weighed against the
probable detriment to the possessor of the land or other persons properly upon it.”).
172
See id. cmt. h.

R
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EMINENT DOMAIN
Although the situations most likely to constitute harmful nonuse
involve derelict owners who passively allow property to decay, even
attentive nonuse can cause harm.173 Many city residents and governments view large expanses of vacant land to be antithetical to a
healthy urban environment.174 As one Philadelphia community organization put it, “[v]acant properties fester like open sores in our
neighborhoods, sapping our wealth and breeding crime and
blight.”175 Governments can use eminent domain to override an
owner’s desire not to use a parcel of property or to warehouse it for
later use. The law of eminent domain allows the state to seize property (used or unused) upon payment of just compensation, where the
use to which the government would put the property is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.176
The state also has a number of tools short of eminent domain to
encourage, or even coerce, owners to make active use of their property where state actors have good reason to think that even attentive
nonuse generates unacceptable social costs. Washington, D.C., for example, charges owners of vacant buildings a property tax rate that is
over five times higher than the rate paid by owners of occupied residential property.177 The owners of blighted property must pay a rate
that is even higher still.178 Baltimore recently enacted a targeted
property tax cut that benefits owner-occupied homes but excludes, in
the words of Baltimore’s mayor, “vacant homes owned by irresponsible speculators.”179 Similarly, during the nineteenth century, local
governments in the American west attempted to force speculators to
put their property to productive use by aggressively using property
173
Cf. Ploof, 71 A. at 189 (upholding plaintiff’s tort claim based on harm sustained as a
result of an owner’s attentive insistence on nonuse of property during plaintiff’s necessity).
174
See MICHAEL A. PAGANO & ANN O’M. BOWMAN, BROOKINGS INST., VACANT LAND IN
CITIES: AN URBAN RESOURCE 2 (2000), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/
reports/2001/01/01-vacant-land-pagano (“[M]any cities, regardless of size and geographic
location, expend tremendous resources trying to ‘abate’ public nuisances associated with
vacant and abandoned properties.”).
175
See CAMPAIGN TO TAKE BACK VACANT LAND, PUT ABANDONED LAND IN OUR HANDS
(2011), available at http://files.wcrpphila.com/PutAbandonedLandinOurHandsSpring
2011.pdf.
176
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231, 241 (1984).
177
See Harvey S. Jacobs, How Government Can Improve the Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
2012, at E3; Real Property Tax Rates, D.C. OFF. TAX & REVENUE, http://otr.cfo.dc.gov/otr/
cwp/view,a,1330,q,594394.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
178
See Jacobs, supra note 177; Real Property Tax Rates, supra note 177.
179
Press Release, Office of Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, City of Balt., Mayor Rawlings-Blake to Introduce Property Tax Cut Legislation (March 19, 2012), available at http:
//www.baltimorecity.gov/OfficeoftheMayor/NewsMedia/tabid/66/ID/2590/Mayor_
Rawlings-Blake_to_Introduce_Property_Tax_Cut_Legislation.aspx.
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taxes to make it unprofitable to hold land in an undeveloped state for
long periods of time.180
*****
It would be accurate to say that, as a general rule, as long as an
owner attends to the obligation not to harm others, the owner is free
to leave the property unused for as long as desired, no matter what
the reasons. But the law of tangible property limits the right not to
use in the presence of harm. Three categories of harm are particularly salient: With the doctrines of necessity and eminent domain, the
harm of allowing the owner’s interest in nonuse to prevail is the risk
of loss to the claimant due to an inability to make use of the property
in question. With nuisance and permissive waste, the relevant harm is
an interference with other owners’ use and enjoyment of their own
property (either contemporaneously or in the future). And with
abandonment and adverse possession, the harm involves a kind of
tacit inducement to waste time or effort using or appropriating unused and apparently unwanted property. The doctrines of estoppel
and undue hardship as applied to innocent improvers combine elements of all three categories of harm.
C.

Normative Justifications for the Right Not to Use

While there is a strong first-order normative case for granting
owners wide latitude not to use their tangible property, this case holds
up only as long as they do not harm others in the process. The law of
property is best understood as an institution designed to allocate
rights over things in order to foster human flourishing.181 Because
human flourishing involves the pursuit of plural and incommensurable goods, property law must take into account a variety of (sometimes
conflicting) values. Among the values relevant to the shaping of a
property system are human life and freedom, with the latter understood as encompassing both autonomy and personhood considerations.182 In addition, because people need material resources in
order to flourish, the impact of property rules on social wealth or efficiency is also vitally important to property’s service of the goal of
180
See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS 60 (2010)
(noting that local governments supported land squatters over absentee landlords by imposing higher taxes on land).
181
See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 117, at 80–101.
182
See, e.g., id. at 84–89 (discussing Aquinas’s views on property and human flourishing, stating that “[p]rivate ownership exists to ensure the ability of human beings (collectively) to flourish”).
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human flourishing.183 Where all these various factors point in the
same direction, property doctrines are typically uncontroversial.184
On the question of nonuse, considerations of autonomy and personhood and efficiency all appear to weigh in favor of the shape of
existing law.
1. Autonomy and Personhood
A system of private ownership serves interests in autonomy and
personhood by, among many other things, delegating to private owners authority over privately owned things.185 As we have already seen
in connection with the many qualifications on the right not to use
aimed at preventing nonuse from harming nonowners or future owners, that authority is not unbounded.186 But a significant part of the
experience of autonomy and personhood with regard to the use and
enjoyment of property consists of determining the timing of the consumption or exploitation of owned property. Implicit in this control
over the timing of consumption or exploitation of property is the
power to delay these uses by holding the property idle for a time, perhaps even a very long time.
A system of private ownership that places a high value on autonomy and personhood will tend to default toward control of property
by owners, including owners’ determinations that property should remain unused for a time. In its broadest sense, Penner correctly observes, “‘use’ refers to a disposition one can make of something that is
purposeful and can be interfered with by others.” 187 For nonuse to
count as a species of use that serves owners’ autonomy and personhood, the nonuse must be “purposeful” and involve “intermittent
physical interaction” with the property.188 But where nonuse does not
result from such a purposeful plan or where nonuse interferes with
third parties’ own autonomy-based interests in the use and enjoyment
of their own property, this rationale for the right not to use breaks
183
See id. at 94–97 (“[S]ocieties must struggle with the challenge of providing adequate opportunities for individuals to obtain the things they need in order to function as
social beings without . . . undermining the necessary incentives for productive activity.”).
184
See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 363–73
(1954) (discussing the difficulties in conceptualizing what property is and formulating a
definition).
185
See id. at 373 (“Private property is a relationship among human beings such that the
so-called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit others to engage in
those activities . . . .”). By autonomy, we primarily mean, in this context, freedom from
coercion or interference by third parties with respect to owned property. By personhood,
we mean to refer to a more affirmative power to express one’s identity as a person through
external material things.
186
See, e.g., supra notes 122–53, 164–67 and accompanying text (discussing adverse
possession, nuisance, abandonment, and innocent encroachment).
187
PENNER, supra note 114, at 70.
188
See id.
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down. The law of tangible property, as it relates to nonuse, broadly
follows this pattern. As our discussion in the preceding pages illustrates, the sort of nonuse that the law protects most robustly is an active, attentive nonuse—the sort of nonuse that most directly serves
owners’ autonomy and personhood. Such attentive, purposive nonuse
is less likely to impose the sorts of harms on third parties associated
with more passive, derelict nonuse that the law penalizes.
2. Efficiency
A system of private ownership serves the goal of efficiency by allocating authority to make decisions over the use of things to those who
derive the most utility from exercising that authority. In the absence
of externalities, market failure, or moral constraints, property theorists by and large favor voluntary transactions as the mechanism for
moving property toward users who would derive more utility from
it.189 Because of the rivalrous nature of tangible property, if people
disagree about how—or, more to the point of this Article, when—to
use the same item of property, they both cannot act on their beliefs at
the same time with respect to the same property. Early consumption
or exploitation of an item of property typically forecloses the possibility of later consumption or exploitation (and vice versa). If an owner
thinks the best use of a particular item of property is to attentively
hold it idle, the principal recourse in a market system of private ownership for someone who disagrees with the owner is to purchase the
property from the owner or to acquire some comparable piece of
property, and put it to more beneficial use.190
On balance, in the absence of harm to third parties, owners who
are good judges of the proper timing of the consumption or exploitation of their property will prosper relative to those who are poor
judges. Thus, granting owners broad control over the timing of use
creates incentives for owners interested in financial gain to gather
good information about how and when to most profitably use their
189

See, e.g., ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 117, at 106–09.
Because land can often be put to multiple uses simultaneously, it provides an important exception to this rule, which may explain why numerous legal cultures that we
would characterize as being based on market systems of private ownership permit nonowners to engage in nondestructive, simultaneous use of land as long as they do so in ways that
accommodate the use choices made by owners. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
It might even be better to think of “land” as we understand it in our legal system as a kind
of amalgam of discrete items of property. Thus, even a theorist who did not subscribe to a
full-blown bundle account of the concept of property might be justified in treating property in land as a (contingent) bundle of discrete, spatially bounded property rights. Cf.
Cohen, supra note 184, at 360–61 (discussing the idea that a fee simple absolute is really
just a “sector of space in time”).
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property. 191 Plausible assumptions about human beings’ general tendency toward short-sightedness suggest that, if anything, owners will
tend to consume or exploit their property prematurely.192 Thus, deferring to owners’ choices not to use their property is most likely, from
the standpoint of enhancing aggregate utility over the long run, the
proper starting point.
But this is only a starting point. Where harm to third parties
from nonuse becomes apparent, the law departs from this default position. Although their content arguably reflects concerns beyond efficiency, the doctrines we have discussed as limiting nonuse all capture
situations in which exercising the right not to use property generates
significant negative externalities for nonowners (or, in the case of
waste, for future owners).193 Considerations of efficiency therefore
appear to point in the same direction as autonomy and personhood
and broadly favor the shape of existing property doctrine as it touches
on nonuse.
III
THE RIGHT NOT

TO

USE

IN

PATENT

In Continental Paper Bag, the Supreme Court held that the right
not to use is absolute in traditional property and therefore, as a species of property, patents should enjoy this right as well.194 As we have
shown above in our discussion of tangible property,195 the law of property as it relates to nonuse is a good deal more complicated than the
Court made it out to be in Continental Paper Bag. Rather than merely
ratifying owners’ choices about nonuse, the law of tangible property
channels and constrains owners’ behavior in situations in which, by
not using their property, they harm others. In this section, we will
argue that, instead of basing its own approach to nonuse on a caricature of property law, patent law would benefit from adopting a similarly qualified approach to nonuse.
191
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54
J.L. & ECON. S77, S90 (2011); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821,
853–54 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S463 (2002); Geoffrey K. Turnbull, The Investment
Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations, 31 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 357, 363–64 (2005); see
also R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14, 18 (1959). It
is control, and not exclusion as such, that generates these incentives. And owners can
enjoy a robust power to control the use of property even where the scope of their right to
exclude follows from their use choices (rather than vice versa).
192
Peñalver, supra note 191, at 854 (arguing that private actors use high discount rates
and disregard long-term consequences when deciding how to use their property).
193
See supra Part II.B.
194
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424, 429–30 (1908).
195
See supra Part II.
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A. Justifying Patent Nonuse According to Tangible Property
Nonuse
As we did with tangible property,196 we will evaluate the normative foundations for nonuse in patent by looking to autonomy, personhood, and efficiency. From the standpoint of human flourishing,
these are (along with the preservation of human life) the most important considerations. These are also the values that underlie the most
influential theories of intellectual property. As we noted above, while
conflicts among these considerations can force us to make difficult
choices, those choices tend to be easier where the various considerations all point in the same direction. Unlike in the context of tangible
property, however, where the important normative considerations appear to line up in support of recognizing a qualified right not to use,
in the patent context they provide only weak and speculative support
for recognizing such a right at all. Two features of patent are responsible for this difference: First, the nonrivalrous nature of the consumption of information means that use of a patented invention by
one party does not deprive the owner of the ability to time her use of
the very same patented invention. Second, the necessary impact of
patent rights on independent inventors’ use and enjoyment of their
own property greatly complicates the task of justifying a right not to
use an invention where that right includes the right to simultaneously
prevent others from using the invention.
1. Autonomy
Viewed from one perspective, the nonrivalrous nature of information consumption decisively eliminates the impact of use by third parties on the autonomy of patent owners. With use conflicts over
tangible property, the law must choose between two people seeking to
make incompatible uses of the same object, or between a nonowner’s
desires to use the object in the face of the owner’s attempt to save it
for later. But allowing a third party to practice an invention neither
forces the patent owner to use the invention now nor requires the
patent owner to forego the power to use it at some later time. The
patent owner remains just as free not to practice the invention or to
practice it later.
If we define the patent owner’s autonomy interest as encompassing the right to control, at least for a limited time, the use of the patented invention by a third party, then that use without the owner’s
permission would interfere with the autonomy of the patent owner.
But to define the patent owner’s autonomy interest in such broad
terms at the outset would be to beg the question we are attempting to
196

See supra Part II.
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answer. The question just is whether or why we should understand
patent rights to encompass the power to block others from using an
invention that the owner has no intention of using. And the impact of
patent law on independent inventors shows how such an expansive
definition of the right not to use butts up against the autonomy of
nonowners to use their own tangible property as they see fit.197 It is
this tendency of patent law, and intellectual property rights generally,
to intrude on the freedom of owners with regard to their own tangible
property that has made intellectual property the source of a great deal
of conflict among libertarian theorists.198
Because protecting the freedom of patent owners to control the
use of an invention comes at the expense of the freedom of nonowners to control the use of their own tangible property, we need to look
elsewhere for reasons to favor the freedom of one of these actors over
the other. Although utilitarian accounts of patent law have dominated the academic commentary,199 considerations of both personhood and utility are potentially relevant to the choice between the
autonomy of the patent owner and that of the alleged infringer.
2. Personhood
Theories of intellectual property drawing on a number of different philosophical traditions have emphasized the connection between
the personal identity of creators and inventors and their intellectual
creations. Ayn Rand, for example, was arguing in these terms when
she claimed that “[p]atents and copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: a man’s right to the product of
his mind.”200 By granting intellectual property rights, she claimed,
“the law establishes the property right of a mind to that which it has
brought into existence.”201 Justin Hughes describes the Hegelian account of intellectual property in similar terms as based on the intuition that “an idea belongs to its creator because the idea is a
manifestation of the creator’s personality or self.”202
Viewing the question of nonuse through the lens of personhood
arguably favors a robust conception of the right not to use. The close
connection between the inventor and the invention suggests why inventors might conceivably have some personhood interests at stake in
197

See Vermont, supra note 92, at 478.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 141 (1974) (discussing the indeterminacy of libertarian ideals with respect to intellectual property).
199
See MERGES ET AL., supra note 35, at 2.
200
Ayn Rand, Patents and Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 125, 125
(1966).
201
Id.
202
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330 (1988).
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controlling the nonuse of their invention.203 As Christopher Yoo has
recently argued in the copyright context, however, personhood interests also accrue to those who would like to use another person’s intellectual property as part of their own creative efforts.204 The same is
likely true of patented inventions, at least in those circumstances
where personhood considerations are implicated. Thus, we do not
consider personhood to count strongly in favor of recognizing robust
rights not to use, particularly in light of patent’s time-limited nature
and the personhood interests of the people seeking to practice the
invention that the patent owner is content not to use. But we are
willing to treat this concern over control of an invention as counting,
albeit weakly, in favor of some limited right not to use a patent.
Even more importantly for our purposes, this (weak) personhood
justification for nonuse would only seem to apply to a patent owner
who consistently and attentively monitors the nonuse of the invention.
Intermittent or delayed invocation of the patent owner’s interest in
nonuse would seem to undercut the legitimacy of an inventor’s claim
that nonuse of the invention reflects important personhood concerns.
Moreover, any personhood implications of nonuse depend on a tight
connection between the individual inventor and the invention.
Where that connection is lacking, personhood will not have as many
implications for nonuse. Where the invention is the product of col203
Consider, for example, an inventor who creates a new device for terminating
pregnancies and obtains a patent for it. Shortly after obtaining the patent, she undergoes
a religious conversion and comes to believe that the use of her device is always deeply
immoral and ceases to practice the invention. It is not hard to understand how, in light of
the tight link between her mind and her invention, the inventor might perceive the use of
her invention by others against her wishes as in some sense an assault on her (new) personal identity. At one time, patent law prevented patents on immoral subject matter by
requiring that inventions be beneficial to society rather than “frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society” to satisfy the utility requirement for
patentability. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568)
(“[A] new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination, is not a patentable invention.”); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1817) (No. 1217). For example, machines useful exclusively for “gambling purposes” were not patentable. See, e.g., Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 89–90
(N.D. Ill. 1889) (citing exclusion of immoral purposes from utility in Bedford). That prohibition was based on collective morals and has in any event largely disappeared. See Juicy
Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). While the state
has left the business of weighing the morality of patents, the possibility that a private party
might acquire a patent for an invention they consider to be immoral solely in order to
block its implementation raises an interesting question. Imagine that an anti-abortion activist purchases the patent invented by our hypothetical doctor solely in order to insure
that the new technique is never used, at least during the life of the patent. We do not rule
out the possibility that the nonuse of the patent could plausibly constitute an important
personhood interest for that person.
204
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Personhood Revisited 4–5 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-39), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2160441.
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laboration, where it is created by an employee of the patent owner, or
where the patent owner simply acquires the patent from the inventor,
the link will be attenuated.
Independent invention will similarly weaken any personhood link
between an initial inventor and the near absolute exclusion currently
granted by patent law. From a narrow personhood standpoint, an independent inventor stands in precisely the same relationship to the
invention as the original inventor who holds the patent. If the reason
for honoring a patent owner’s desire not to practice her invention is
the status of the invention as a product of the inventor’s intellectual
efforts, that reason would suggest not honoring that desire where doing so would interfere with the same relationship between another
inventor and that inventor’s independent intellectual creation.205
3. Efficiency
Efficiency considerations only favor recognizing a robust right
not to use and, importantly, the ability to block others’ use if doing so
will increase overall utility, not just patent holders’ net worth. The
usual argument is that the two are connected.206 In patent, recognizing a robust right to exclude third parties from using a patented invention enhances utility by creating incentives for inventors to invest
time and resources in the creation of new inventions and by facilitating transactions once the invention has been created. But the application of this utilitarian story becomes more complicated if we are
talking about a patent owner who is not proactively using and disseminating, and therefore not taking advantage of her opportunity to
profit from her invention, but is instead only leveraging patent exclusion to block the invention’s use or exploiting the leverage provided
by the power to block those who are. There are two arguments supporting the position that recognizing a robust right not to use while
also blocking third parties from using is a utility-enhancing strategy:
an argument based on negative consequences of premature exploitation for overall demand and a revised version of the argument from
incentives.
First, in some cases, early exploitation of the patent may have the
effect of shrinking the overall profit generated by the patented invention relative to the counterfactual of a period of nonuse followed by
later exploitation.207 It is not unreasonable to think that a period of
205

See NOZICK, supra note 198, at 182.
See Julie S. Turner, Comment, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory
of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 186–88 (1998) (describing the “incentive-toinvent” theory, where income received from patents is necessary to encourage innovation).
207
See id. at 182–83 (explaining that patent owners might “sit” on a patent right because the invention may not be commercially viable initially but that viability might change
as time progresses).
206
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temporary nonuse of a patent followed by exploitation later in the
patent’s lifecycle might be a profit maximizing strategy over the total
life of the patent. That strategy would be undermined by allowing
others to step in and exploit a patent when its owner has chosen not
to use it. If an invention would work better, for example, when marketed along with another device still under development, premature
exploitation might poison the well of consumer demand by stigmatizing the product and making it harder to market once the later device comes on line. Although conceivable, this scenario strikes us as
sufficiently unusual such that it does not cut strongly in favor of recognizing an unqualified right not to use. In any event, it would seem
only to favor recognition of purposeful and self-consciously temporary
nonuse as part of a longer-term marketing strategy, not permanent or
indefinite nonuse. It would certainly not cover the behavior of the
patent owner in Continental Paper Bag, and it does not cover the sort of
ad hoc, opportunistic behavior characteristic of pure patent assertion
entities.
A second, broader utilitarian argument for a right not to use the
patent is the incentives story that Lior Strahilevitz has described but
not fully endorsed.208 Discussing Continental Paper Bag, Strahilevitz
says the following:
Viewed ex ante . . . a plausible justification for the result in
Continental Paper Bag emerges. It might be the case that were companies like Eastern not permitted to obtain blocking patents to protect their previous patents, they would not make the necessary
investment of resources into inventing either the previous inventions or the blocking improvements. In other words, the availability
of blocking patents may be a necessary part of the incentives that
the patent system uses to encourage innovation in particular industries. When faced with the choice between (a) a decent paper bag
machine and a blocking patent on an improved, but suppressed,
machine and (b) a substantial probability that neither machine will
be invented, choice (a) seems acceptable.209

Strahilevitz’s argument focuses on the specific facts of Continental Paper Bag, in which the plaintiff was using the patent to block competitors from operating machines that might have reduced the
profitability of the plaintiff’s existing manufacturing business. It does
not address itself to the question of patent trolls. Nevertheless, the
basic structure of his incentives argument can easily be extended to
208
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 811 (2005); see also
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,
74–84 (2001) (discussing the incentives which may cause a patent holder not to practice a
patent and what those incentives mean for calculating damages in the case of infringement
of such patents).
209
Strahilevitz, supra note 208, at 811.
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cover them. The idea would be that the possibility of increased, private returns to inventors or their transferees from a strategy of patent
trolling (nonuse of their patent coupled with active pursuit of lawsuits
to extract rents from infringers) may supply a significant increment of
incentive for the production of new inventions. Recognizing the right
not to use comes at a cost in some cases, but, overall, the consequence
of granting the right will nonetheless be greater innovation through
its enhancement of the incentives established by the patent system. As
Strahilevitz concedes with respect to blocking patents, this “additional
incentives” explanation may amount to a “just-so” story.210 This seems
equally true of our modified incentives argument for allowing patent
trolls. It is hard to know how much weight to give to the bare assertion that some innovation may not occur if the right not to use is not
available to potential inventors, and that the lost increment of innovation outweighs the costs of recognizing the right.
On balance, we do not find the incentive story in support of a
right not to use to be compelling in the patent context. The benefits
of recognizing a right not to use in terms of incentives to innovate are
highly indirect and almost impossible to measure. This particular
style of speculative incentive narrative has been derided as “peculiarly
unsusceptible to empirical proof”211 and is still today “extraordinarily
indeterminate.”212
In the absence of any compelling empirical evidence either way,
the question of what to do with the incentives argument probably
comes down to defaults. If our default position is to favor market
competition over monopoly, this argument is probably not enough to
provide utilitarian justification for legal recognition of the right not to
use.213 To the extent that incentives considerations could be said to
support recognition of some limited right not to use one’s patent
(and to block others from doing so), they would seem to do so most
plausibly, not for the patent troll, but where nonuse is part of a purposive strategy that aims to maximize the owner’s income from the patent over its entire lifetime. While this might encompass the blocking

210

Id.
See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 50 (1973) (noting the difficulty in determining whether a given length of patent term overrewards or underrewards
invention).
212
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 41 (1996) (noting the disagreement among economists as to the efficiency of the patent system for encouraging
innovation).
213
The speculative nature of these incentive-based arguments relative to the widespread agreement about the efficiency benefits of a right not to use in tangible property
should at the very least strongly urge caution in using the property analogy to support a
robust right not to use in patent law.
211
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patent strategy used by the plaintiff in Continental Paper Bag,214 it
would plainly not cover the passive, opportunistic strategy at work in
the typical patent assertion business model.
Moreover, as to both patent trolls and blocking patents, within a
utilitarian framework, we need to consider the costs of providing the
extra incentive generated by recognizing a right not to use. There are
real and immediate costs to recognizing that right. In particular,
three sorts of harm associated with patent nonuse are especially significant: (1) foregone consumption,215 (2) increased risk of inadvertent
infringement,216 and (3) increased risk of losing the invention.217 All
of these are either absent or (as we will see) partially mitigated by
offsetting benefits in the context of unused tangible property.
As we discussed above, because objects of traditional property are
consumed rivalrously, nonuse can—from an efficiency standpoint—
be an entirely legitimate choice. Building a housing development on
Blackacre now means that, for all practical purposes, Blackacre will
not be available for a nature preserve in ten years. 218 If we allow
owners to store up a reservoir full of oil in the hope that prices will
rise over the long run, that oil will not be available for consumers to
purchase and use in the short term. Someone has to decide whether
to develop Blackacre now or save it for later, or whether to store the
oil or consume it now. Trying to figure out who should make these
decisions and how they should go about deciding is one of the central
puzzles of theories of tangible property. Despite its apparent passivity,
purposeful nonuse is in fact a legitimate choice by the owner that can,
under the right circumstances, help the resource ultimately move to
its highest valued (non)use. The law of tangible property by and large
creates space for owners to make these timing choices in the first
instance.
But this justification for nonuse is not available for patent. A patentable invention must have a “specific benefit . . . in currently available form.”219 Because of this, society already knows, as a matter of
static efficiency, how to allocate the right to use the invention. As
pointed out by Kenneth Arrow, “information . . . , say a new method of
production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available [to
214
See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 428 (1908) (citing
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 150 F. 741, 743 (1st Cir. 1906)); Strahilevitz,
supra note 208, at 811.
215
See infra notes 218–24 and accompanying text.
216
See infra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
217
See infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
218
See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071, 1079–81
(2011) (“Very often . . . land is sufficiently stable that human transformations will remain
in place almost indefinitely unless human beings actively restore the land to its prior
form.”).
219
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966).
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all] . . . . This insures optimal utilization of the information . . . .”220
Rather than supporting patent nonuse, then, static considerations
push strongly against supporting a right not to use that includes a
right to block others from using the invention.
Where patent owners claim a right not to use, they are not just
claiming that they have no obligation to use their invention but also
that their patent confers the right to block others from using the patented invention, even with the others’ own tangible property and even
where those others have independently developed the same invention. This is always costly. As noted by Arrow, “precisely to the extent
that [patent exclusion] is successful, there is an underutilization of . . .
information.”221 Arrow was lamenting the underutilization from pricing of the invention above marginal cost.222 In that situation, some
(but not all) potential users are getting access. In the pure nonuse
scenario, in contrast, no one is getting access to the invention.
Because of the nonrivalrous nature of information consumption,
this consumption loss works differently in the patent context than it
does with tangible property. Although third parties also do not consume unused tangible property, that cost is necessary to protect the
owner’s opportunity to consume or use the property at some later
time.223 In the case of patent, however, the loss of consumption due
to nonuse is a pure loss. During the term of the unused patent, all of
the utility of the invention is withheld from consumers.224 The loss
associated with forgone patent consumption is particularly acute with
respect to situations covered by the doctrine of necessity within tangible property law. Where the owner of a patent covering some resource necessary to sustain lives chooses not to use the invention, the
costs of legally recognizing a right not to use would be exceptionally
high.
In addition to consumer deadweight loss, nonuse also encourages
a kind of induced waste. Once an invention has been created, there is
no social benefit to spending further resources to (re)discover the
220
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616–17 (1962).
221
Id. at 617.
222
Id. at 617–19.
223
We are assuming here an actual conflict over the timing of use. Where resources
(such as land) can support multiple nonconflicting uses, protecting the right not to use
against demands to engage in nonconflicting uses (e.g., through exclusion) is not strictly
necessary to protect control over the timing of use, though it may be desirable in order to
indirectly protect or enhance owners’ control of their property. See Smith, supra note 114,
at 1693–94. The indirect protection of control through exclusion more closely resembles
the situation of nonuse in patent.
224
With technology advancing at such a blistering pace, in some areas of technology,
an invention may well be worthless (from the standpoint of public consumption) when the
public finally can have access at the expiration of the patent.
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same innovation. Independent inventors expend valuable scarce resources reinventing the patented invention. It is a plausible assumption that a patent holder openly practicing an invention by
manufacturing or licensing the invention provides a kind of notice to
other inventors that reduces the occurrence of such waste. Indeed,
the ability to obtain a patent in order not to use it will be most valuable and will provide the most incentive precisely where the benefit to
society of granting a patent monopoly seems lowest—where independent inventors are highly likely to come up with the same idea on
their own in order to practice the invention.
The waste induced by patent nonuse includes not only the resources used in the reinvention process but also the costs associated
with litigation over the patented invention, costs that might have been
avoided had the independent inventor known about the patent.225 Although patents supposedly provide notice through the patent disclosure process, the volume of patents granted is so high that the quality
of this notice is fairly attenuated.226 Actual notice derived from actively monitoring issued patents is prohibitively expensive.227 Moreover, penalties associated with a finding of willful infringement
discourage competing inventors from carefully scrutinizing patent
disclosures.228
Crucially, from the perspective of patent assertion entities, this
induced waste is a feature, not a bug. The patent assertion business
model is more lucrative the larger the investments that have been
sunk into a project by independent developers at the time the patent
assertion entity enters the scene.229 The patent assertion entity therefore has an incentive to maximize that waste in order to increase its
own private gains. Unlike the owner of tangible property, on whom
the law may visit a remedial penalty if she allows her property to look
as if no one wants it, a patent owner operating under the Continental
Paper Bag version of the right not to use actually increases her benefits
225

See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORL. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210.
226
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 17, at 8–9.
227
See Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15–16), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2016968 (“Even if a patent lawyer only needed to look at a [software]
patent for 10 minutes, on average, to determine whether any part of a particular firm’s
software infringed it, it would require roughly 2 million patent attorneys, working full-time,
to compare every firm’s products with every patent issued in a given year. At a rate of $100
per hour, that would cost $400 billion. For comparison, the software industry was valued at
$225.5 billion in 2010.”).
228
See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22.
229
See Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083, 2126 (2009).
NELL
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the more people stumble into infringing on the patent and the more
costly it is for them to get out.230
Finally, and most speculatively, practicing an invention is a way of
reducing the risk of losing an innovation. The actual practice of an
invention integrates it more securely within the storehouse of human
knowledge. Nonuse of an invention introduces the risk that the innovation will simply be forgotten, thereby necessitating expenditure of
resources toward its reinvention even after patent protection has expired.231 Furthermore, in an era where strong network externalities
accompany technology, intentional suppression can prevent those externalities from developing and can prevent the technology from integrating itself into common usage. When the patent expires, the
public may have little use for the invention not because it is inherently
not useful but rather because during the period of suppression, alternative paths developed and became dominant. In a sense, the public
may never get to know how useful such technology could have been.
Viewed through this temporal lens, patent nonuse may constitute an
IP analog of permissive waste in the tangible property context. The
public has a future interest in the “remainder” of the patent owner’s
time-limited right to the invention—the incorporation of the patented invention into the public domain upon the expiration of the
patent. This future interest has long been understood to be an essential part of the patent bargain: the public grants the inventor a timelimited monopoly in exchange for the inventor’s disclosure of the invention.232 When an invention is forgotten because of the patent
holder’s intentional suppression of the invention, the public suffers a
loss akin to that experienced by the holders of remainder interests in
a property when the life tenant fails to maintain it. Although we normally think it is hard to harm an idea, the possibility that a piece of
knowledge may be forgotten or condemned to irrelevancy if not used
suggests that useful ideas can spoil when they go unused.
There appears to be no compelling first-order utilitarian justification for giving legal protection for nonuse across the board, especially
for the kind of nonuse in which patent assertion entities engage.
Such nonuse is not part of a concerted strategy to market the pat230
See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT
295–99 (2012) (describing the “catastrophically negative” implications of Continental Paper
Bag, especially for independent inventors).
231
Cf. Peñalver, supra note 218, at 1079–80 (2011) (describing how human memory
can be inscribed in property).
232
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.”).
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ented invention. Instead, it involves merely opportunistically waiting
in the hope that someone with sufficiently deep pockets will inadvertently stumble into infringing on the patent before it expires. In the
meantime, the patent assertion entity is willing to warehouse the patent indefinitely, even to its expiration, without making active efforts to
exploit it.
B. Conclusions: The Weakness of the Normative Case for
Recognizing a Right Not to Use in Patent
To recap, the normative considerations that justify nonuse in the
tangible property context do not favor a robust interest by patent owners in the power not to use their inventions while, at the same time,
preventing others (including independent inventors) from doing so.
To the extent that they offer support for the power of patent owners
not to practice their invention, they seem most plausibly to do so for
two reasons: to maintain patent’s incentive structure or to protect the
personhood interest of an inventor. The former reason only applies
where nonuse occurs as part of a concerted and consistent strategy by
the patent owner to maximize the value of use of the patent over its
entire lifetime by managing the timing of the invention’s use. The
personhood justification only applies, if at all, to an individual inventor who consistently tries to block use of the patented invention, and
even where that is the case, protecting personhood interest does not
justify blocking use by independent inventors.
Patent assertion entities do not fit into either of these categories.
They are typically not the sorts of patent owners who could plausibly
assert strong personhood interests in nonuse. Moreover, their nonuse
is not part of a purposive strategy to maximize the value of the patented invention over the lifetime of the patent by carefully timing its
use in response to perceived market conditions. Instead, for patent
trolls, nonuse is part of a business model that depends entirely on
others interpreting those market conditions and disseminating the invention, or not, as the case may be. Such a passive, opportunistic strategy is too far removed from the patent incentives model to justify
paying the social costs of nonuse. The lack of normative support for
recognizing a right not to use within patent law suggests that the zone
of permissible nonuse should be narrower in the patent context than
it is within the law of tangible property.
Although the first-order normative case on behalf of nonuse is
weak, it is important to consider the possibility that second-order considerations, particularly those having to do with information and administration costs (such as the difficulty of distinguishing between
different kinds of nonusers or between bad faith and inadvertent in-
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fringers), might provide a reason to treat all acts of nonuse alike.233
As Henry Smith puts it: “If any nonpracticing entity is treated as a troll
and is unable to get an injunction, specialization in R&D versus manufacturing is problematic. If nonpracticing and nonlicensing entities
are per se problematic, this also gives the first potential licensee a lot
of leverage.”234
Smith’s insights about the risks for practicing entities of penalizing nonpracticing entities are valuable, but they do not support broad
legal recognition of an unconstrained right not to use along the lines
favored by Continental Paper Bag.235 This is particularly clear if the
duty to use is only enforced where a patent owner asserts a claim for
infringement against an independent inventor. Limiting the duty to
use in this way does not create an incentive for aggressive infringers to
actively force owners to defend their various timing and use decisions,
a situation that would seem more likely to generate some of the
problems that worry Smith. Restricting consideration of nonuse to
infringement claims against independent inventors would narrow the
range of cases in which owners would have to justify their choices to
those in which the costs of nonuse are the highest. It would preserve
the benefits of a broad delegation of discretion over use in the patent
context while limiting the most palpable costs of nonuse. The common law of property’s long experience with the many doctrines regulating the distinction between harmful and harmless nonuse suggests
that a context-specific response to nonuse in the patent arena would
not necessarily generate overwhelming information or administrative
costs.
Indeed, the sorts of informational considerations highlighted by
Smith likely counsel in favor of enforcing an obligation to use the patent. In contrast to tangible property, patent rights define duties
whose boundaries are more costly and difficult for nonowners to discern,236 even with the constructive notice provided by the publication
of issued patents.237 As we have discussed above, actual use of a patent
creates valuable information.238 Using and disseminating an invention enhances the notice to third parties about the existence and nature of a patented invention that can help good faith actors reduce
the risk of inadvertent infringement. Thus, there are significant infor-

233

See Smith, supra note 119, at 1783–86.
See Smith, supra note 229, at 2126.
235
210 U.S. 405, 424, 429–30 (1908).
236
See Liivak, supra note 92, at 1676–80.
237
The Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office publishes
each patent issued by the USPTO.
238
See supra Part III.A.3.
234
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mational costs to recognizing a right not to use in patent law.239 Enforcing an obligation to use would not only foster first order social
benefits but would also arguably help to reduce the informational burdens imposed by hard-to-detect patent boundaries. As we will show in
Part IV, a shift in the direction we are recommending already appears
to be occurring within patent law.

PREVENTING

THE

IV
HARMFUL NONUSE

OF

PATENTS

To summarize our argument so far, a sophisticated comparison
of patent to tangible property does not offer much support for recognition of a broad right not to use within patent law. Tangible property law permits owners not to use their property, but that is because
the rivalrous nature of tangible property means that recognizing the
right not to use generates significant autonomy and personhood benefits for owners and simultaneously serves social interests in efficiency.
Even with these benefits, property law restricts nonuse where it results
in (1) serious injury to a claimant seeking a right to use the unused
property, (2) interference with others’ ability to use and enjoy their
own property, and (3) inducement to waste time or effort appropriating the unused property.240 As our discussion in Part III showed, enforcing an unused patent against independent inventors introduces
the risk of very similar sorts of harms. Unlike tangible property, however, it does so while generating few apparent offsetting benefits.
When a patent owner does not use the invention, others waste time
and effort reinventing it. If the patent owner then attempts to enjoin
or seek damages from independent inventors who have sunk time and
money into independently generating the unused innovation, the patent owner interferes with the inventors’ use and enjoyment of their
own property. Where the patent covers an invention that others need
for their well-being, the nonusing patent owner may generate all three
sorts of harm.
A comparison of property to patent therefore supports confining
patent owners’ right not to use their invention within narrower
bounds than in the domain of tangible property. Rather than starting
with a default in favor of nonuse in the absence of a demonstration of
harm to third parties, the law might begin with a default in favor of
239
See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20–27 (2013)
(describing search costs as a transaction cost in patent law where the patent holder may be
the lowest cost searcher and therefore has the burden to seek out users of the invention);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (describing patent marking and the
consequences of failing to mark). But see Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 341, 362–76 (2010) (raising concerns about commercialization obligations and the
identity problem).
240
See supra notes 143–63, 168–72 and accompanying text.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-6\CRN605.txt

1482

unknown

Seq: 46

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

11-SEP-13

15:16

[Vol. 98:1437

active use, departing from it only in the presence of special circumstances, such as knowing infringement. Such a shift could occur
through a variety of mechanisms.
As patent law is a statutory body of law,241 Congress certainly has
the authority to modify almost all aspects of it.242 While international
commitments might make it difficult for Congress to condition the
ongoing validity of patent rights on diligent efforts to disseminate the
invention to users,243 the obstacles are probably not insurmountable.
Alternatively, Congress could modify the statutory provisions on remedies to effectuate a de facto obligation by patent holders to disseminate the invention. We are not endorsing this strategy but simply
observing the kinds of modifications Congress has the power to implement. Such congressional modification of the right not to use would
be very unlikely to run afoul of constitutional property protections.
Instead, a congressionally imposed duty to disseminate inventions
would be akin to countless regulations of tangible property, past and
present.244 Because of their necessarily prospective and general nature, statutory interventions may be ill equipped to distinguish effectively among patent trolls, research and development specialists,
independent inventors, and willful infringers.
In any event, federal courts have ample tools at their disposal to
permit them to, in effect, impose on patent owners a limited duty to
disseminate their inventions even in the absence of congressional action. In the domain of remedies, courts enjoy a great deal of discretion, and judicial reform of nonuse could operate through that
avenue. 245 In particular, courts could restructure patent remedies—
both injunctive relief and damages—to take nonuse into account. As
outlined above in Part III, we think there is, at best, only a weak, speculative case for any net harm caused by independent inventors infringing on an unused patent. Where a patent is being practiced, the
case for harm from infringement looks substantially different. In assessing remedies for an independent inventor’s infringement of an
241

Howard T. Markey, Why Not the Statute?, 65 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 331, 331

(1983).
242
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“[T]he Congress may, of
course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its
judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”).
243
See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, Mar. 20,
1883, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
244
See Hart, supra note 116, at 1259–63. As a harm-preventing regulation, even the
application of a duty to practice an invention on existing patents would not violate constitutional property protections. Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 412–14
(1915) (holding valid application of a new municipal nuisance ordinance prohibiting
brickmaking within city limits against a landowner who had purchased the land for the
purposes of brickmaking).
245
See infra notes 303–06.
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unused patent, judges should require the patent owner to show some
proof of harm. Because proving harm would be difficult for the specific case of infringement of nonused patents by independent inventors, this more searching inquiry into harm will likely reduce
injunctive relief and damages for patent assertion. Indeed, lower
courts already appear to be adopting this approach with regard to injunctive relief in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay,246
and we think that the normative considerations we have been discussing support similar reform of patent damages as well.
A. Injunctions
There have been earlier calls for reducing the availability of injunctive relief for patent holders that are not practicing the invention.247 Our point is to highlight that such reforms are supported by
the comparison between patents and property. Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,248
district courts appear to have already begun moving in that direction.
In eBay, the patent holder MercExchange asserted its patent for
“[a] method and apparatus for creating a computerized market for
used and collectible goods”249 against the popular and well-known Internet auction site, eBay. In the district court, the jury found that
MercExchange’s patent was valid, that eBay had infringed on it, and
that damages should be awarded.250 But the district court denied
MercExchange’s request for a permanent injunction.251
MercExchange had licensed the patent to others, and the district court
reasoned that a “plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents” and “its
lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents” would be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the patent holder would “suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”252 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the denial of the permanent
injunction while noting its “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”253 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated
the judgment of the court of appeals.254 The Supreme Court criticized both lower courts for having applied categorical rules in consid246

See Golden, supra note 76, at 2113
See Turner, supra note 206, at 199–204.
248
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
249
U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265, at [57] (filed Nov. 7, 1995); eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
250
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
251
Id. at 715.
252
Id. at 712.
253
MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
254
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 390–91.
247
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ering whether to grant permanent injunctions.255 The Supreme
Court criticized the district court for developing what amounted to as
a categorical rule against injunctions for nonusing owners, noting that
this particular categorical rule was “in tension with” the Supreme
Court’s own decision in Continental Paper Bag.256 Nor did the Supreme Court spare the Federal Circuit. “Just as the District Court
erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief,” the Supreme Court
chided, “the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such
relief.”257 The Court held that the “decision whether to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with
traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in
other cases.”258
Every member of the court joined the opinion of the Court in
eBay,259 but the case produced two very interesting concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg, suggested that, while injunctions should not be automatic,
patent infringement would be very likely to justify injunctive relief in
most cases.260 The Chief Justice alluded to past practice to this effect,
pointedly observing that “a page of history is worth a volume of
logic.”261 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, took the opposite tack. Justice Kennedy
emphasized that “the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate
the remedy for a violation of that right” and noted that “[t]o the extent earlier cases establish a pattern of granting an injunction against
patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern simply illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent.”262 He specifically considered the relevance of nonuse to the
propriety of injunctive relief, noting that “the economic function of
the [nonusing] patent holder presents considerations quite unlike
earlier cases.”263 He then turned to the problem of the patent assertion business model. “An industry has developed,” he said, “in which
firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
255
See id. at 392–94 (“Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals below fairly
applied the[ ] traditional equitable principles in deciding respondent’s motion for a permanent injunction.”).
256
Id. at 393 (citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–30
(1908)).
257
Id. at 394.
258
Id.
259
Id. at 388.
260
See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
261
Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
262
Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
263
Id.
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instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”264 He concluded that
“equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is
well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and
legal developments in the patent system” and “district courts must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases
before them.”265
Though the Court’s opinion in eBay approvingly cited to Continental Paper Bag, 266 the two concurrences point toward disagreement
about its continuing implications for the right not to use.267 The difference between these two approaches to permanent injunctions matters a great deal for patent assertion entities. While most patent trolls
are not interested in enforcing a permanent injunction against their
targets, the plausible threat of the permanent injunction helps them
to extract maximum value out of users who have sunk enormous costs
into the infringing activity.268 Recall the now infamous case of NTP,
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.269 In that case, NTP, a patent-holding
company, sued Research in Motion (RIM), the maker of the formerly
ubiquitous BlackBerry.270 The patents were found to be valid and infringed upon by RIM.271 The district court granted $53.7 million in
damages to NTP.272 But even more importantly, it granted a permanent injunction that threatened to shut down the entire BlackBerry
network.273 Over the course of the next few months, RIM desperately
tried to settle with NTP all the while cowering under the shadow of
the impending shutdown.274 Ultimately, RIM settled with NTP for
$612 million.275 Most commentators agree,276 and common sense
264

Id.
Id. at 397.
266
Id. at 393 (majority opinion) (noting the district court’s failure to apply Continental
Paper Bag).
267
Compare id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that the practice of courts
granting injunctive relief against patent infringers is not surprising given “the difficulty of
protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies”) with id. at 396 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Roberts’s notion that “issuing injunctions against patent
infringers” rests on “‘the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary
remedies’”).
268
See id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
269
418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
270
Id. at 1290.
271
Id. at 1291–92.
272
Id. at 1292.
273
Id.
274
See Ian Austen, Companies Unable to Settle BlackBerry Suit, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/technology/10blackberry.html.
275
See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Maker Reaches Deal in Patent Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/technology/03cnd-blackberry.html.
276
See Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
280, 281 (2010) (“To many observers, this payment reflected the strong bargaining position NTP enjoyed by virtue of its threat to shut down BlackBerry service, not the underlying value of NTP’s patented technology.”).
265
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suggests, that the bulk of that settlement resulted from the injunction.
If such permanent injunctions are harder for nonusing patent owners
to obtain, settlements will be smaller as well.
Although the Supreme Court itself was less than united on the
question of how easy an injunction should be to obtain after proving
infringement, empirical evidence suggests that—since eBay—courts
have indeed become less likely to grant injunctive relief to strictly patent assertion entities.277 This alone is quite a substantial shift in judicial behavior,278 and it is very much in line with the approach we are
advocating toward the right not to use in patent law. Yet that change
alone leaves open an important question. District courts now take seriously eBay’s directive to focus on the equitable factors relating to the
grant of injunctions.279 A court must consider if the patent holder has
“suffered an irreparable injury”280 and if “remedies available at law are
inadequate to compensate for that injury.”281 And if district courts
are now generally denying injunctive relief for patent assertion entities, the question is, what facts are most salient for them? Are courts
denying injunctive relief for the more modest rationale that “remedies
at law” are adequate, or are they denying injunctive relief because
there is no injury that warrants an injunction? It appears that at least
the presumption of irreparable harm from infringement alone no
longer stands and there is increased scrutiny on the actual harm
caused by the infringement. The Federal Circuit recently held as
much: “We take this opportunity to . . . confirm that eBay jettisoned
the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the
appropriateness of injunctive relief.”282 Even more recently, the Federal Circuit held that a showing of irreparable harm required “a sufficiently strong causal nexus [that] relates the alleged harm to the
alleged infringement.”283
Some have criticized the response to eBay in the lower courts as
too broad and unfocused, one that threatens to undermine a richly
developed system of presumptions and safety valves that have grown
up around the use of injunctive relief within discrete areas of the
277
Golden, supra note 76, at 2113 (“[D]istrict courts have responded in apparent lockstep to Justice Kennedy’s concerns [in eBay] about trolls. Since the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in eBay, district courts appear to have consistently denied permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer has contested the patent holder’s request for such relief
and the infringer and patent holder were not competitors.”).
278
See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 & fig.1 (2012).
279
See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012).
280
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
281
Id. at 388.
282
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
283
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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law.284 Our approach, which would eliminate the presumption in
favor of injunctive relief only in cases brought by nonusing patent
owners against independent inventors, would cabin the reach of the
developing remedial reform to those cases that generate the most
damage in exchange for the least social benefit. The impact on existing law would be further mitigated by placing the burden on the
defendant to show that, having been found to be an infringer, the
standard presumption in favor of injunctive relief should not apply in
a particular case because the defendant is an independent inventor.285 After the defendant meets that burden, the court might then
place the burden of proof on the plaintiff seeking an injunction to
show that it was actively practicing the patent or seeking to disseminate the invention, rather than merely pursuing an opportunistic ex
post strategy of licensing the patent. Importantly, a judge’s decision
not to grant injunctive relief because of a plaintiff’s nonuse does not
mean the plaintiff is left empty-handed.
B. Damages
The patent statute requires that the courts “award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer.”286 Courts have traditionally interpreted that statutory provision to allow damages that include nearly any but-for consequence of the infringement. As a result, courts have granted to patent
assertion entities damages that exceed the value of the unexploited
invention, often encompassing value generated by the defendant’s efforts to commercialize the patented invention.
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed that the
test
for compensability of damages . . . is not solely a “but for” test in the
sense that an infringer must compensate a patentee for any and all
damages that proceed from the act of patent infringement. Notwithstanding the broad language of § 284, judicial relief cannot re284

See Gergen et al., supra note 279, at 205–06.
Exactly such an evidentiary burden was suggested by Learned Hand with respect to
independent invention. See The American Patent System: Hearing on S. Res. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 114
(1956) (statement of Hon. Learned Hand, J.) (suggesting easing the thorny evidentiary
issues relating to independent invention by “throw[ing] the burden on the supposed infringer to show that he did not have to have recourse to the patent in order to do what he
did”).
286
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). In addition, the court “may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found.” Id. These treble damages are used almost
only in cases of willful infringement. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360,
1368 (2007).
285

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-6\CRN605.txt

1488

unknown

Seq: 52

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

11-SEP-13

15:16

[Vol. 98:1437

dress every conceivable harm that can be traced to an alleged
wrongdoing.287

Hopes that this line of reasoning would provide for a serious consideration of actual, provable harm in patent damages was quickly dispatched. The court gave examples of consequences that were too
“remote . . . such as a heart attack of the inventor or loss in value of
shares of common stock of a patentee corporation caused indirectly
by infringement [to be] compensable.”288 Indeed, despite a vigorous
dissent in the case,289 the court held that damages were available even
from lost sales of unpatented items caused by the infringement.290
Just three months after Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit decided King
Instruments Corp. v. Perego, which gave even stronger support for an
expansive vision of patent damages.291 The court held that a
patent confers the right to exclude others from exploiting an
invention. . . .
This understanding . . . informs the purpose and scope of the
damages provision. . . . [A] patentee need not have exercised its
natural right to itself make, use, or sell the invention. The damages
section, section 284, protects the right to exclude, not the right to
exploit. . . .
. . . [T]he award of damages compensates for the violation of
the patentee’s right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention. The patentee need not make, use, or sell the invention to sustain an injury to that right.292

This passage makes clear the assumptions underlying the Federal Circuit’s approach toward patent damages. The Federal Circuit simply
assumes harm to exist whenever there is an unlicensed infringement
of the right to exclude.
The current state of patent law as it relates to damages depends
on the same flawed use of the property analogy we observe in Continental Paper Bag.293 A balanced vision of patents, like the one we describe in Part III, would provide much needed correction within the
law of patent damages as it relates to patent trolls. Indeed, numerous
scholars have already been calling for reforms of patent damages. In
particular, they have focused on nonpracticing patent owners who sue
independent inventors.294 Many of those scholars have argued for
287

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Id.
289
Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
290
Id. at 1546–47.
291
See King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
292
Id.
293
See, e.g., id. at 949 (holding that patent rights confer the right to exclude and not
the right to exploit).
294
See Chiang, supra note 239, at 2–6; Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2008) (arguing that the notice
288
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consideration of commercialization efforts as a factor in calculating
damages.295 Though those reforms have not yet found their way into
patent law, there have been notable examples of judges calling for
reforms along these lines.296 Here, too, we think our arguments can
help.
Above,297 we argued in favor of denying injunctive relief in cases
of infringement of nonused patent by independent inventors, not because patents are not property, but rather because, even as property,
the balance of harms and benefits of nonuse and access are important
considerations. Once we are forced to take into account the balance
of harms in the ways described in Parts III and IV, the need to reform
the law of patent damages seems to follow as a natural consequence.
Importantly, a reform as simple as tweaking burdens of proof
could have a significant impact. For damages, the courts have long
held that “the patent owner bears the burden of proof,”298 and “a patent owner must prove a causal relation between the infringement and
its loss.”299 Damages cannot “be speculative.”300 In an important recent case on patent damages, Chief Judge Rader, sitting by designation in Northern District of New York, held that “[a]n award of
damages by the jury ‘must be upheld unless . . . grossly excessive or
monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on
speculation or guesswork.’”301 In other words, patent damages aim to
compensate for some type of harm, and those harms need to be estabfunction of the patent system needs to be improved to address the troll problem); Gerard
N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810–14 (2007); David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the
Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128–32 (2009); ,Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law
of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–3), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract=1932834; Turner, supra note 206, at 182; Brent Rabowsky, Note, Recovery of Lost Profits on Unpatented Products in Patent Infringement Cases, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 281,
285–86 (1996); Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 111–14 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w13141; Samson Vermont, Basing Patent Remedies on Harm to the World
Instead of Harm to the Patentee 3–8 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Vermont,%20Samson%20-%20Paper.
pdf; see also Blair & Cotter, supra note 208, at 74–84 (discussing in detail the economics of
the idle patent).
295
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 206, at 182–83.
296
See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1556–57 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
dissenting); King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 954 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
297
See supra Part IV.A.
298
BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
299
Id. at 1218.
300
Id.; see also KIEFF ET AL., supra note 87, at 1250 (“The patent owner bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the profits lost and cannot meet this burden with guesswork and speculation.”).
301
Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (N.D.N.Y 2009)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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lished by the patentee. And though it was a case focusing on injunctive relief, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay noted that courts,
with their wide “discretion,” are “well suited . . . to adapt to the rapid
technological and legal developments in the patent system” and “district courts must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before them.”302 Whether they are conceiving of
patent damages as lost profits or a reasonable royalty, courts awarding
patent damages should require proof of the actual harm caused by the
infringement in order to determine how much compensation the patent holder is due.
It is certainly true that the patent statute mandates a floor for
patent damages. The statute states that damages should be “in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer.”303 Though it establishes a floor, the statute does not
preclude a court from determining the value of a “reasonable royalty”
by considering an owner’s lack of commercialization efforts. In cases
where an owner is not practicing the patent or actively disseminating
the invention, reasonable royalties might even be limited to an award
of nominal damages.304 Indeed, in light of the information costs imposed by nonpracticing entities and the lack of any nonspeculative
harm for infringement of an unused patent, it is quite sensible to condition reasonable royalties on efforts to commercialize. Suggestions
along those lines already exist in the literature.305 Furthermore, in
light of the existing burden of proof for damages and a district court’s

302
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
303
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
304
Design patents are an exception. They are protected by their own, more explicit
damages provision. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). According to § 289, infringers of a design
patent must disgorge their “total profit.” Although the provision leaves some ambiguity as
to the proper way to determine “total profit,” its focus is on the gain to the infringer rather
than the harm inflicted on the patent owner. See id. Arguably, for design patents, reforming the damages remedy along the lines we suggest would require a statutory amendment. See Mark A. Lemley, A Rational System of Design Patent Remedies 16–21 (Stanford Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper, Paper No. 2226508, 2013), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2226508. But note that historically, design patent remedies were largely
consistent with the arguments made in this Article. Our focus has been on the reform of
patent remedies in the context of a nonusing patent holder suing an independent inventor. Our arguments do not reach the question of the proper patent remedy for cases of
copying, and indeed stronger remedies are likely justified in those cases. Consistent with
that distinction, historically, design patents did allow recovery of the infringer’s “entire
profit,” but “Congress wasn’t too worried about the potential unfairness of the entire profit
rule in 1887 because the knowledge requirement was thought to limit the scope of design
patent litigation to true copyists.” Id. at 5. Afterward, in 1952, Congress removed that
knowledge requirement from the statute leading to our current expansive design patent
damages available even against independent inventors. Id. at 5 n.19.
305
See Heald, supra note 294, at 1174–75.
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discretion in these matters (as reemphasized by eBay), district courts
already have the tools necessary to implement such reforms.306
It is important to emphasize, again, that these reforms are supported by embracing patents as property. After all, as we observed
above, in the context of the innocent improver, where the law of tangible property denies an owner injunctive relief but requires compensation to the nonusing property owner, it measures compensation as
the fair market value of the undeveloped land. It does not typically
give the owner a share of the value added by the improver.307 Since
eBay, patent assertion entities are having a hard time proving the type
of harm that merits injunctive relief.308 Recognizing that such a showing of harm is already part of patent damages suggests that such entities may soon encounter similar difficulties establishing that they are
entitled to exorbitant damage awards.309
306
In fact, Judge Posner, sitting by designation in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., explored
the issue of nominal damages for cases where no harm was found despite a finding of
infringement. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(“I want to dispel any impression that such relief—substantial ‘compensatory’ damages for
no tangible injury—would be proper . . . .”).
307
See supra notes 133–41 and accompanying text. The same holds true in the context
of chattels when measuring damages for accession. See, e.g., Hyde & Everit v. Cookson, 21
Barb. 92, 105–06 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) (awarding the value of the unimproved raw
materials in a case of accession).
308
See Chien & Lemley, supra note 278, at 9–10.
309
It might at first appear that another avenue to achieve similar results would be to
use the defenses of laches and equitable estoppel. As currently defined, however, these
doctrines are unlikely to provide much help. As to laches, the courts have prevented recovery in cases where the plaintiff has failed to act reasonably prudently to file a case and “the
delay resulted in material prejudice or injury to the defendant.” Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti
Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Certainly, the harm from the most
egregious cases of patent assertion, where waiting was a calculated matter, could be made
to fit within the doctrine. Unfortunately, the doctrine has generally been limited to a time
period before the filing of the lawsuit and that delay period “cannot begin prior to the
time the patent owner has a legally sufficient infringement claim.” 6-19 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05[2][a][i] (2012) (citing Adelberg Labs., Inc. v. Miles,
Inc., 921 F.2d 1267, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Laches applies until the date of suit.”)). Those
constraints limit the effectiveness of laches for curbing patent assertion abuses. Once a
potential infringer has taken affirmative acts that create “a legally sufficient infringement
claim,” they likely have already made the business and technological decisions that lock
them into a very unfavorable bargaining position with respect to the patentee. Id. The
closely related doctrine of equitable estoppel also has potential, but has been interpreted
in ways that make it unlikely to help. That doctrine limits recovery when a “patent owner
through conduct, positive statement, or misleading silence represents to the infringer that
his business will be unmolested by claims of infringement, and . . . in reliance on that
representation, the infringer continues or expands his business.” Id. § 19.05[3]. Few patent assertion entities would make such representations. Both doctrines only penalize patent holders when they are delinquent in asserting their patent rights. But our argument is
that actively policing and asserting their exclusive rights is not enough. The law should, in
addition, encourage active dissemination of the invention to those that have not yet independently acquired it. As a result, at least as currently understood, these doctrines are not
enough.
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C. Patent Misuse and Patent Nonuse
In the preceding sections, we have argued that, drawing on the
analogy with tangible property, patent remedies, both injunctions and
damages, should be weaker for nonpracticing entities when they are
suing independent inventors. If one were to argue that, in the case of
nonpracticing entities, patent remedies should vanish against all defendants, then that argument might run afoul of an explicit statutory
command. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) states that “[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . of a patent shall be denied
relief or deemed guilty of misuse . . . by reason of his having . . .
refused to license or use any rights to the patent.” Other proposals to
moderate remedies for patent assertion entities have noted that
§ 271(d) represents a potential obstacle.310 Instead, our proposal
stops short of rendering patents owned by nonpracticing entities totally unenforceable in a way that would constitute a denial of relief
within the meaning of § 271(d). Our proposal maintains both the
presumptive validity and enforceability (even by injunction) of patents
owned by nonpracticing entities. It merely limits the remedies of such
owners in infringement lawsuits against independent inventors. For
example, even nonpracticing entities may well have some real remedy
against copyists who acquired the invention from the published patent
despite the lack of active dissemination. And even outside the case of
copyists, nonpracticing entities would not be totally foreclosed but
would instead carry a burden of showing concrete harm before they
could obtain injunctive relief or damages. Because most of them
would not be able to carry that burden, the result would be much less
aggressive remedies than those enjoyed by similarly situated, practicing entities.
CONCLUSION
Courts and scholars often invoke property law in patent debates
in order to defend absolutist positions within patent law. This has
been particularly true of patent law’s treatment of the right not to use.
This Article has shown that comparing property and patent can be a
fruitful undertaking and does not necessarily lend itself to absolutist
patent rights. The right not to use is instructive. Tangible property
law looks at nonuse with a balanced eye that aims to make room for a
great deal of owner control over the timing of use while preventing
nonuse from harming others, either by depriving them of resources
they badly need, inducing them to waste time and effort, or interfering with the use and enjoyment of their own property. Moreover,
310
See Turner, supra note 206, at 182 n.13 (arguing that because her proposal focused
only on injunctive relief, it did not run afoul of § 271(d)).
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looking to the normative considerations at work behind the law’s
treatment of the right not to use, tangible property reveals that the
differences between property rights in tangible things and patent
rights in ideas tilt the balance even more decidedly against recognizing a robust right not to use in patent. Thus, far from supporting an
absolute right not to use in patent, as the Supreme Court suggested in
Continental Paper Bag, the analogy with property supports a far more
constrained right not to use, particularly against independent
inventors.
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